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Samaritans: Good, Bad and Ugly:
A Comparative Law Analysis*
Damien Schiff**

For two thousand years the story of the Good Samaritan has
captivated the Western mind.' As an explication of the divine
*An earlier version of this article was presented in April, 2004, before a
comparative law seminar led by Joseph Darby, J.D., Ph.D, Professor
Emeritus, University of San Diego School of Law. I am grateful to Professor
Darby for his encouragement. I thank David S. Moynihan, J.D., LL.M. (Int'l
Law), LL.M. (Tax), and the Reverend Joseph N. Tylenda, S.J., for their
helpful comments.
** Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California. J.D.,
University of San Diego School of Law, 2004; B.A., Georgetown University,
2000; Law Clerk, Hon. Victor J. Wolski, United States Court of Federal
Claims, 2004-05. The views expressed herein represent the opinions of the
author only.
1. Luke 10:25-37.
And behold, a certain lawyer got up to test him, saying, "Master,
what must I do to gain eternal life?" He said to him, "What is
written in the Law? How dost thou read?" He answered, "Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy
whole soul, and with thy whole strength, and with thy whole mind;
and thy neighbor as thyself." And he said to him, "Thou hast
answered rightly; do thou this and thou shalt live."
But he, wishing to justify himself, said to Jesus, "And who is my
neighbor?" Jesus answered, "A certain man was going down from
Jerusalem to Jericho, and he fell in with robbers, who after stripping
him and beating him went their way, leaving him half-dead. But, as
it happened, a certain priest was going down the same way, and
when he saw him, he passed by. And likewise a Levite also, when he
was near the place and saw him, passed by. But a certain
Samaritan as he journeyed came upon him, and seeing him, was
moved with compassion, and he went up to him and bound up his
wounds, pouring on oil and wine; and setting him on his own beast,
he brought him to an inn and took care of him. And the next day he
took out two denarii and gave them to the innkeeper and said, 'Take
care of him; and whatever more thou spendest, I, on my way back,
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command to love one's neighbor, the parable represents Christ's

answer to a lawyer's attempt at self-justification in asking who
qualifies as a "neighbor."2 The biblical account does not imply
that the Levite and the Priest, both of whom passed by the injured
man, had broken Hebraic law. That is its point. Charity begins
where justice ends. The Good Samaritan parable teaches that
justice alone is radically insufficient to bring human beings to the
fullness of existence; that end can be achieved only when justice is
3
supplemented by charity.
In the West the primary purpose of justice was rendered in
the maxim unicuique tribuere jus suum. 4

The duties of justice

could be compelled and were properly within the competence of
the state, unlike the duties of charity; these the state left to "Him
who searches the heart."5 This was the universal opinion in the
West until the late eighteenth century, when the first bad
By the early
Samaritan criminal statutes were enacted. 6
will repay thee.'"
"Which of these three, in thy opinion, proved himself the
neighbor to him who fell among the robbers?" And he said, "He who
took pity on him." And Jesus said to him, "Go and do thou also in
like manner."
Id.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Whitesides v. Southern R. Co., 38 S.E. 878, 880 (N.C. 1901)
("...suffering and death appeal.. .to the feelings of humanity, for which the
good Samaritan has always been revered and extolled, to the shame and
condemnation of the priest and Levite... but history fails to show that a
breach of the Levitacal law could have been claimed....") (Cook, J.,
dissenting).
4. This maxim, along with honeste vivere and alienum non laedere,
formed the basis of the Classical and Byzantine conception of civil justice.
See, e.g., THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 3 (J.B. Moyle, D.C.L. trans., 4th ed.
Gaunt 1999) [hereinafter INSTITUTES] ("Justice is the set and constant
purpose which gives to every man his due. Jurisprudence is the knowledge of
things divine and human, the science of the just and unjust."); THE DIGEST OF
JUSTINIAN 3 (Theodore Mommsen, Paul Krueger & Alan Watson eds., 1985)
[hereinafter DIGEST] ("The basic principles of right are: to live honorably, not
to harm any other person, to render to each his own."). Importantly, the
focus of each of these principles is on the actor as one obliged to do something
or to refrain from doing something; justice is thus duty-and not rightsbased.
5. H.D. Minor, The Moral Obligation as a Basis for Liability, 9 VA. L.
REV. 420, 431 (1923).
6. The phrase "bad Samaritan statutes" refers to those statutes that
punish with criminal sanction persons who fail to assist or fail to attempt to
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twentieth century, Russia, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Germany
had all enacted statutes requiring citizens either to assist others
in need of rescue or notify the authorities.
During the 1930s, when Communism had taken deadly hold
of Russia, National Socialism Germany, and Fascism Italy, the
affirmative duties that bad Samaritan statutes created were made
more rigorous. 7 In 1941 Marshall Petain brought occupied France
into line with this trend by enacting the country's first duty-torescue provision.8 After World War II, Germany, France and Italy
underwent considerable political changes, yet each retained its
bad Samaritan statute. The countries then behind the Iron
Curtain also uniformly adopted duty-to-rescue statutes. 9 Despite
this powerful movement, few common law jurisdictions followed
suit, and those that did, did so only halfheartedly. 10
Today, with the exception of five states,1 ' no American
jurisdiction recognizes a general duty to rescue in either criminal
or private law. In contrast, almost every civil law jurisdiction in
Europe, as well as in Latin America, recognizes various types of
duties to rescue and related tort actions. 12 How to account for this
assist another in need. Likewise, a "bad Samaritan" is one who fails to assist
another in need. For a more detailed but less-encompassing definition, see
generally JOEL FEINBERG, Harm To Others, in 1 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAw 126 (1984). The phrase "Good Samaritan statutes" refers to
those statutes that immunize would-be rescuers from tort actions by the
person intended to be helped. Likewise, a "good Samaritan" is one who
complies with the duty to assist, whether successful in lending assistance or
not. The object of the good Samaritan's endeavors, or the bad Samaritan's
failures, is the "victim."
7. See John P. Dawson, Rewards for the Rescue of Human Life?, in THE
GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAw 63, 69 (James M. Ratcliffe ed., 1966)
[hereinafter GOOD SAMARITAN].
8. 31 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE FRENCH
PENAL CODE 120 (Edward A. Tomlinson trans., 1999).
9. F.J.M. Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans: A Comparative
Survey of Criminal Law Provisions Concerning Failure to Rescue, 14 AM. J.
COMP. L. 630, 656-57 (1966).
10. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 663-1.6 (LexisNexis 2002); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-56-1 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN.
Tit. 12, § 519 (2002); MINN, STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1) (West 2000).
11. Vermont, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Rhode Island and Hawaii. These
states have criminal statutes imposing a duty to assist or to contact the
authorities under certain circumstances. See supranote 10.
12. Alberto Cadoppi, The Failureto Rescue in Continental Criminal Law,
in THE DUTY TO RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 93, 104 (Michael A.

80

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW [Vol.11:77

incongruity? Several reasons come to mind: (1) The common law

is individualistic and is repulsed by broad affirmative duties, no
matter their inspiration, (2) the welfarist systems of most
European countries naturally complement collective and
affirmative legal duties, whereas the laissez faire model in
common law countries generally conflicts with these same
affirmative duties, (3) the enactment of duties to rescue represents
a triumph of tort values in their "competition" with the values of
contract and (4) differing conceptions of the nature of the state
lead to duties to rescue vel non.
Whether the common law should adopt the civil law tradition
of a general duty to rescue is a question requiring a comparative
law analysis for a complete answer. This comparative inquiry also
has the happy result of testing, in one highly specialized area, the
convergence thesis, 13 which maintains that the common law and
the civil law are gradually shedding their differences to become
indistinguishable. I begin my analysis in Part I with an historical
introduction. 14 Following that groundwork, I closely parse dutyto-rescue statutes from civil law and common law jurisdictions,
and highlight important distinctions among the civilian examples
in Part 11.15 Subsequently, in Part III, I review the main
objections to duties to rescue arising from psychology, history,
culture, American constitutional law, causation theory, philosophy
and theology. 16 Along the way I demonstrate why at first glance a
civil law-type duty to rescue, sounding in either tort or criminal
law,
appears
incommensurable
with
Anglo-American
jurisprudential fundaments, and why the Europeans have
traveled so far down the road of affirmative duties while the
common law countries have "lagged."
I ultimately conclude in Part IV that a wholesale adoption of
the civilian approach is unwarranted, but what is possible, and
Menlowe & Alexander McCall Smith eds., 1993).
13. For a variety of views, see, e.g., JAN SMITS, THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW 2-6, 28-33, 103-05 (Nicole Kornet trans., 2002). See generally
Alan Watson, A Common Private Law for Europe?, 9 MAASTRICHT J. EURO. &
COMp. L. 329 (2002); Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MOD.
L. REV. 44 (1997); Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not
Converging, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996).

14. See infra Part I and text accompanying notes 18-54.
15. See infra Part II and text accompanying notes 55-206.
16. See infra Part III and text accompanying notes 207-77.
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indeed appropriate, is a limited statutory duty to inform the
authorities or professional rescue personnel in emergencies. To
that end I have appended a model statute and commentary. The
model law encompasses the best of the European and civilian
experience while tempering the whole in light of common law
necessities. 17 The model statute is drafted with an eye toward
striking a fair compromise between, on the one hand, the
legitimate bases for imposing a duty to rescue, and on the other,
the equally legitimate reasons for preserving a substantial sphere
of individual autonomy.
I. HISTORY

A. From Ancient Times through the Nineteenth Century
According to Pufendorf, the ancient Egyptians imposed a
general duty to rescue.' 8 Plato's Laws had a bad Samaritan
20
statute, 9 but in Roman law there was no general duty to rescue.
Christian Europe was not deaf to Christ's parable: both St.
Augustine and St. Thomas recognized the moral obligation to help
another in need. 2' Notwithstanding this moral duty, pre-modern
17. See infra Parts IV.A and IV.B.
18. Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 97.
19. THE LAWS OF PLATO 277 (Thomas L. Pangle trans., 1980) ("He who
was a bystander in any of these cases and failed to give help according to the
law must pay a penalty .... ").
20. Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 97. But Cicero believed that there were
two types of injustice: that which one causes, and that which one allows to
happen. See CICERO, DE OFFIcIIs 25 (Walter Miller trans., 1968).
There are, on the other hand, two kinds of injustice-the one, on the
part of those who inflict wrong, the other on the part of those who,
when they can, do not shield from wrong those upon whom it is being
inflicted. For he who, under the influence of anger or some other
passion, wrongfully assaults another seems, as it were, to be laying
violent hands upon a comrade; but he who does not prevent or
oppose wrong, if the can, is just as guilty of wrong as if he deserted
his parents or his friends or his country.
Id.
21. Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 97. For St. Thomas's opinion, see his
SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, QU.79, A.3:
I respond saying that an omission supposes the lack of a good, and
not just any good, but an owed good. The good owed according to
reason pertains to justice: to the legal type of justice, if the debt be
accepted according to the order of divine or human law; to the special
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Europe imposed no general duty to rescue, and, not surprisingly,
given the chronic problem of the Middle Ages-lawlessness. 22 For
if the medieval state had a difficult enough time enforcing laws to
prevent citizens from acting, how much more trying it would have
been to enforce laws that required citizens to act.23 In the
Enlightenment's wake, European legal theorists generally opposed
legal duties to assist: neither Pufendorf nor Kant advocated
24
them.
The first European jurisdiction to impose any statutory duty
to rescue was Bavaria in 1751; the duty applied, however, only in

type of justice, if it be considered as owing to one's neighbor.
Wherefore it follows that justice is a special virtue, and a habit, and
that an omission is a special type of sin distinct from those sins that
are opposed to other virtues. Wherefore it follows that to do the
good, to which is opposed an omission, is a certain and special part of
justice distinct from the refusal to do evil, to which is opposed a
transgression, and thus is an omission distinguished from a
transgression.
Id. (translation mine).
This is not to say that interest in altruism is strictly Western. See, e.g., THE
WORKS OF MENCIUS 201-02 (James Legge trans., 1970).
Mencius said, "All men have a mind which cannot bear to see the
sufferings of others.... [Elven now-a-days, if men suddenly see a
child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience
a feeling of alarm and distress. They will feel so, not as a ground on
which they may gain the favour of the child's parents, nor as a
ground on which they may seek the praise of their neighbours and
friends, nor from a dislike to the reputation of having been unmoved
by such a thing. From this case we may perceive that the feeling of
commiseration is essential to man ....
Id.
22. This is a natural result of the general absence of a strong central
government. The one European exception to that-England-was not
immune from civil strife and foreign intrigue during the reign of the
Angevins. See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE BIRTH OF BRITAIN 187-95 (1956)
(contrasting the powerful central government of Henry I with civil strife
during the reign of his successor, Stephen).
23. And there surely is a peculiar disjunction when we speak of
enforcement of the law in the Middle Ages, because no police force existed;
enforcement was self-help. But this is not to say that moral restraint was
absent; quite the contrary, the feudal system was entirely founded upon a
man's observance of his moral obligation to keep the peace, whether as lord
or vassal. 2 HILLAIRE BELLOC, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 41 (1927). And the
more important the person, the graver the breach of "his peace." See
CHURCHILL, supra note 22, at 216.
24.

Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 98.
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times of external aggression. 25 A broader duty was recognized in
the Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana (1768) and the Neue
Bambergische Peinlische Gesetzgebung (1792-95).26

A similar

provision was included in the proto-German Civil Code, the
PreussischesAllgemeine Landrecht (1791).27 The Strafsgesetzbuch

(1871) provided for a duty to rescue only when there existed a
common danger or disaster; the statutory provision was referred
to as the Liebesparagraph,28 perhaps denoting its Christian
inspiration.
. For the composers of the French Code Pgnal of 1810, the
notion of affirmative duties imposed by law was repugnant to the
classical liberal view then in vogue, which posited man as selfsufficient and autonomistic. 29 In this vein one French scholar has
remarked that in the revolutionary slogan "libertg, egalit,
fraternitg,"fraternitg comes last.30 Similar opposition to a legal
duty to assist occurred in Italy, where a proposal for a general
duty to rescue was attacked because it conflicted with the
longstanding principle that such a duty should only be imposed on
certain people at certain times and not generally. 31
Early Spain (1822) adopted a duty to rescue in its Criminal
Code, 32 while Portugal (1867) was the first to provide a private
cause of action based upon violations of the duty to rescue. 33
Peculiarly, Russia (1845) provided a duty to rescue but made it
applicable only to Christians, reserving the issue for the
ecclesiastical courts. 34 Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century,
half the European continent recognized a general duty to rescue
punishable by criminal sanction.
At common law no such duty developed. Although England

25. Id. at 98.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 100-01.
29. Id. at 102.
30. ANDR9 TUNc, RECUEIL D.H., quoted in Josef Hofstetter & Wolfgang V.
Marschall, Amendment to the Belgian Code Pdnal: The Duty to Rescue
Persons in Serious Danger, 11 AM. J. CoMP. L. 66, 70 n.18 (1962).
31. Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 99.
32. Id. at 99-100.
33. Id. at 104.
34. Id.
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was not without supporters for a general duty to rescue, 35 most
common law jurisdictions adopted the view of Lord Macaulay,
expressed in his Notes on the Indian Penal Code:
It is true that the man who, having an abundance of
wealth, suffers a fellow creature to die of hunger at his
feet, is a bad man, a worse man, probably, than many of
those for whom we have provided very severe
punishment. But we are unable to see where, if we make
such a man legally punishable, we can draw the line. If
the rich man who refuses to save a beggar's life at the
cost of a little copper is a murderer, is the poor man just
one degree above beggary also to be a murderer if he
omits to invite the beggar to partake his hard-earned
rice? 36

35. See e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, SPECIMEN OF A PENAL CODE, in 1 WORKS
164 (J. Bowring ed., 1844) ("Every man is bound to assist those who have
need of assistance, if he can do it without exposing himself to sensible
inconvenience. This obligation is stronger, in proportion as the danger is the
greater for the one, and the trouble of preserving him the less for the other.").
See also Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to
Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 3
nn.11-13 (1993) (citing Plato, John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham as
supporting the general duty to rescue).
36.

THOMAS B., LORD MACAULAY, NOTES ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE,

reprinted in THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY 161-62 (Thomas C. Grey
ed., 1983) (the "line-drawing" objection to duties to rescue). Professor Malm
terms this the "sorties" argument, which goes thus: The law can require that
a person go one step in helping another; why not a second step? See Heidi
Malm, Civic Virtue and the Legal Duty to Aid, in CIVILITY AND ITS
DISCONTENTS 213, 219 (Christine T. Sistare ed., 2004) [hereinafter CIVILITY].
If the moral significance between not acting and step one is indistinguishable
from the moral significance between step one and step two, then the law
cannot make a principled stand at enforcing step one while leaving step two
to the individual; therefore, the law must enforce step two. See id. What
about step three? And four? And ad infinitum until one finds that the law
requires step fifty-two because it required step two. See id. The typical
response to the Macaulay-sorties argument is that the law must make
arbitrary distinctions all the time; a line must be drawn if we are to have law
at all; hence a line-drawing attack is really an attack on the principle of
regulated conduct. See e.g., Lionel H. Frankel, Criminal Omissions: A Legal
Microcosm, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 367, 382-84 (1965). On the other hand, we do
regulate by arbitrary line-drawing and accept the inescapable element of
arbitrariness as inseparable from the act of regulation, but we are willing to
tolerate the cost because we believe that some regulation of the conduct in
question is appropriate; in the case of duties to rescue, the central issue is
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Absent some special relationship between the rescuer and the
one to be rescued, the common law did not impose a legal
obligation on the would-be Good Samaritan. The New Hampshire
37
Supreme Court's opinion in Buch v. Amory Manufacturing
exemplifies the common law position in American jurisdictions.
An infant trespasser's hand was crushed by heavy equipment
after the adult overseer had told the child to leave but made no
further efforts to protect the minor from harm. The court
commented on the legal-ethical question presented:
With purely moral obligations the law does not deal. For
example, the priest and Levite who passed by on the
other side were not, it is supposed, liable at law for the
continued suffering of the man who fell among thieves,
which they might, and morally ought to have, prevented
or relieved. Suppose A., standing close by a railroad, sees
a two year old babe on the track, and a car approaching.
He can easily rescue the child, with entire safety to
himself, and the instincts of humanity require him to do
so. If he does not, he may, perhaps, justly be styled a
ruthless savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable
in damages for the child's injury, or indictable under the
38
statute for its death.
The common law made allowances for a duty to rescue in the
following circumstances: (1) where a special relationship existed
(e.g., spouse to spouse, parent to child, or landowner to licensee or
invitee); (2) where a contract or statute imposed an affirmative
duty upon the rescuer; (3) where the rescuer had voluntarily
assumed the duty to rescue; and (4) where the rescuer had created
the danger. 39 Under the heading of "special relationship," the

whether any regulation is appropriate, and therefore the cost of arbitrariness
in line-drawing may outweigh the benefits of any regulation. See Joseph
Ellin, The Mind of a Bad Samaritan,in CIVILITY 233, 242 ("Scrooge is better
dealt with by the Spirit of Christmas than by the shadow of the hangman.").
For sharp criticism of Lord Macaulay's argument, see FEINBERG, supra note
6, at 150-59.
37. 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1898).
38. Id. at 810. For a similar and nearly contemporaneous English view,
see JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 3 A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND

9-11 (1883).
39. For a collection of typical cases, see Paul H. Robinson, Criminal
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common law adopted the continental principle
omissionem: a parent who wilfully failed to feed
that it should die, would be guilty of murder. 40
law did not impose a general duty to rescue
applying between strangers.

of commissio per
his child, wishing
But the common
paradigmatically

B. Twentieth Century Developments
Once the Nazis assumed power in Germany, their totalitarian
philosophy led, in 1935, to a great broadening of the existing duty
to rescue. 41 One commentator sees in this strengthening a typical
difference between the liberal and authoritarian state: Whereas
for the liberal state harm and offense form the basis of
criminality, in the authoritarian state any ethical or political
breach of duty can be criminalized because it threatens the social
collective and elevates the individual over the group. 42
As a result of German occupation, Vichy France passed its
own duty-to-rescue statute. The Germans wanted both to make
Frenchmen help imperilled German soldiers and to foster ratting
on the Gaullists. 43 At that time, French commentators were
mixed on the new duty: some adamantly opposed it; others
espoused it as the pinnacle of Christian charity."
Following
Liability for Omissions: A Brief Summary and Critique of the Law in the
United States, 55 REvUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT P8NAL 633, 638-39 (1984).
40. France has come to the opposite conclusion. F.J.M. Feldbrugge, Good
and Bad Samaritans:A Comparative Survey of Criminal Law Provisions
ConcerningFailure to Rescue, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 630, 648 (1966).
41. Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 101.
42. Id. This principle is exemplified by the language of the Nazi statute,
which included the phrase gesundes Volksempfinden [sound sense of the
people]. See id.
43. Edward A. Tomlinson, The French Experience with the Duty to
Rescue: A Dubious Case for Criminal Enforcement, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
Comp. L. 451, 462-63 (2000).
44. Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 102. The French experience must be
understood in the background of the infamous Woman of Poitiers Case of
1897. See Tomlinson, supra note 43, at 464. Blanche Monnier was the
insane daughter of the Dean of the local college; she was never seen outside
the family home, although it was acknowledged that the Dean took good care
of her. Id. at 464-65. Once the Dean passed away, Blanche Monnier's mother
refused to provide for her needs. Id. The brother, who lived across the street,
was aware of the squalid conditions in which Blanche lived, for he came over
frequently and visited. Id. A few weeks following the mother's death,
Blanche's condition was discovered and prosecutions for assault and battery
were brought against, among others, the brother. Id. Although the trial
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Germany's defeat, France repealed almost every piece of
legislation passed during the occupation. One of the few statutes
that survived was the duty-to-rescue provision.
After World War II, Belgium enacted its own duty to rescue,
but not without opposition.45 Spain and Portugal modified their
provisions. 46 In Spain the duty was broadened slightly in the
1950s, while Portugal's new Civil Code (1982) followed the
German model4 7 Austria adopted its first duty to rescue in
1975.48 Whereas there is but one prominent European holdout,
Sweden having rejected a bad Samaritan statute in 1972, 49 almost
every Latin American nation has enacted a duty-to-rescue
provision in its criminal code. 50
Presently there is no duty to rescue in England.51 Likewise,
generally among U.S. jurisdictions there is neither a criminal nor
a civil duty. Those states that have criminal provisions impose
only slight penalties,5 2 and none recognizes a private cause of
action by a victim against the bad Samaritan. 53 Every U.S.
jurisdiction has a Good Samaritan statute, however, whereby the
rescuer is made immune from a civil suit prosecuted by the rescue
court convicted the brother, the appeals court reversed on the grounds that
the brother had committed no affirmative act, that the French courts were
not empowered to criminalize activity on their own; and that if an affirmative
duty were to be imposed upon the brother, it would have to come from the
legislature. Id. at 465-67.
45. See Hofstetter & Marschall, supra note 30, at 66-67. Those in favor
of the provision argued that it would counteract moral laziness; those
opposed rallied against the legal enforcement of morality. See Cadoppi, supra
note 12, at 102-03.
46. Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 103.
47. Id. at 104. See Jorge de Figueiredo Dias, Les Delits d'Omission dans
le Droit PdnalPortugais,55 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT P9NAL 845, 849
(1984).
48. Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 104. See Manfred Burgstaller, Omissive
Offenses and Penal Responsibility for Omissive Conduct in Austria, 55 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PigNAL 535, 543 (1984).
49. Id.
50. Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 104.
51. See W. Douglas Cullen, The Liability of the Good Samaritan, 1995
JURID. REV. 20, 20-21 (1995). For the Australian experience, see generally
Louis Waller, Rescue and the Common Law: England and Australia, in THE
GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAw 141 (James M. Ratcliffe ed., 1966) [hereinafter
GOOD SAMARITAN].

52.
53.

See supra note 10.
See infra Part II.A.2.
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victim. 5 4
II. POSITIvE LAW

This Part sets forth the positive law of several civil and
common law jurisdictions. The positive law of these jurisdictions
consists of criminally enforceable duty-to-rescue statutes, private
causes of action for failure to assist, private causes of action by
Good Samaritans for damage incurred during rescue, and Good
Samaritan immunity. Each piece of positive law is set forth in
turn.
A. Statutes
Criminally enforceable duty to rescue statutes are found in
modern day civil and common law jurisdictions alike.
1. Civil Law Jurisdictions
This Part identifies five criminally enforceable duty to rescue
statutes, four existing and one former, representative of those
found in European civil law jurisdictions: Germany, France, Italy,
Spain and Communist Russia.
a. Germany
Germany's duty to rescue provision was amended following
World War II, and it presently reads:
§323c. Failure to Render Assistance. Whoever does not
render aid during accidents or common danger or need,
although it is required and can be expected of him under
the circumstances and, especially, is possible without
substantial danger to himself and without violation of
other important duties, shall be punished with
imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine. 55

54. Melody J. Stewart, How Making the Failureto Assist Illegal Fails to
Assist: Observation of Expanding Criminal Omission Liability, 25 AM. J.

CRIM. L. 385, 387 n.9 (1998).
professionals. Id.
55.

These statutes generally apply to medical

Compare 32 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE

GERMAN PENAL CODE 192 (Stephen Thaman trans., 2002) with C6digo Penal

art. 219, reprinted in Dias, supra note 47, at 849 (the new Portuguese
provision). Failure to assist is punishable "in case[s] of grave necessity,
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b. France
The present provision in the French Criminal Code derives
from the 1945 version of the Vichy law of 1941. It reads:
Article 223-6[2]. Any person who willfully abstains from
rendering assistance to a person in peril when he or she
could have rendered that assistance without risk to
himself, herself, or others, either by acting personally or
by calling for aid, is liable to [a penalty of five years of
misdemeanor imprisonment and to a fine of 500,000
francs] .56

c. Italy
Italy's present duty-to-rescue criminal statute, dating from
the 1930s, exemplifies to one Italian scholar the Fascist
Weltanschauung57 Italy's statute reads:
Article 593. [Failure to help]. Whosoever, finding an
abandoned child of less than ten years, or another person
incapable of providing for himself through physical or
mental illness, through old age or for other cause, omits
to inform the authorities immediately, is punishable...
[penalty]
The same penalty may be imposed on one who,
finding a human corpse or a person who appears to be
dead, or an injured person or a person in danger, omits to
caused namely by disaster, accident, public calamity or common danger that
imperils the life, health, physical integrity or liberty of another [if the aid
could have been rendered] without grave risk to one's life or physical
integrity or without violating other important duties." C6digo Penal art. 219,
reprinted in Dias, supra note 47, at 849 (translation mine). A study
conducted in the 1960s found no German cases permitting recovery by the
rescue victim against a bad Samaritan on the basis of a violation of the
German Penal Code. See John P. Dawson, supra note 7, at 71 n.16.
56.

31
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120. The French cases dealing with civil liability are discussed
infra Parts II.B & II.C. The Belgian Criminal Code, Article 422, requires
personal assistance or seeking the help of others if the victim is in grave
peril, whether or not the would-be rescuer personally observes the situation,
but there is no duty where serious danger would be present to the would-be
rescuer or to another. Cadoppi, supranote 12, at 127-28.
57. Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 112.
PENAL CODE

90

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.11:77
give immediate assistance or to inform the authorities
without delay. 58

d. Spain
The Spanish Criminal Code has contained a bad Samaritan
provision since the first half of the nineteenth century.5 9 The
present provision reads:
489 bis. He who does not help a person who finds himself
unprotected and in manifest and grave danger, when he
could help without risk to himself or to another, shall be
punished with major arrest or a fine of 30,000 to 60,000
pesetas. [ 1 The same penalty for him who, prevented
from lending assistance, does not urgently seek outside
help. [ 1 If the victim finds himself in distress due to the
actions of him who failed to lend assistance, the penalty
60
shall be minor detention.

58. Id. at 128.
59. Id. at 103.
60. CODIGO PENAL [C.P.] art. 195 (Spain) (translation mine). The Penal
Code for the Mexican Federal District, also applicable to the Republic in
federal matters, contains a similar provision:
Upon finding abandoned in whatever place a minor unable to care
for himself or a wounded person, disabled or threatened by any
danger whatsoever, a punishment of from one to two months in
prison or a fine of from 10 to 500 pesos shall be imposed, if the
person does not give immediate notice to the authorities or fails to
lend the necessary assistance, when he could have done so without
personal risk.
CODIGO PENAL FEDERAL [C.P.F.] art. 340 (translation mine). The Guatemalan
Criminal Code (1973) reads in pertinent part:
One who, encountering a child under ten who is lost or abandoned, a
wounded person, or a person who is disabled or who is facing
imminent danger, fails to give him the help which is necessary in the
circumstances, when he could do so without personal risk, will be
punishable with [penalty].
Cadoppi, supranote 12, at 128. The Cuban Criminal Code (1979) provides:
Whosoever does not help or provide the required aid to a wounded
person or to one exposed to a danger which threatens his life, bodily
integrity or health, when there would be no risk to his own person, is
punishable.., with a prison sentence of three to nine months and a
fine, or both.
Id. at 129.
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e. Communist Russia61
Article 130 of the Stalinist constitution of 1936 provided that
all citizens had to "respect the rules of socialist intercourse." 62
Professor Agarkov was the first to argue that article 130 created

61. For an analysis of the affinity between Marxism and duties to rescue,
see John Harris, The Marxist Conception of Violence, 3 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 192,
197, 209-11 (1974). "Marx believes that where human intervention could
prevent this harm, then failure to prevent the harm must be seen as a cause."
Id. at 197. Harris attempts to justify the Marxist conception of violence and
provide a logical if not desirable intellectual underpinning for adopting that
conception.
He divides refrainings into two distinct groupings, that of
negative causation and that of negative action. Id. at 209. Negative
causation exists where a person could have prevented X by some action but
refrained from that action, which action is "expected or required" of him, or
where X involves harm to a human being. Id. Negative action exists where a
person's failure to act brought about X, and where the person did know or
should have known this "causal" connection. Id. Harris argues that his
distinction reflects H.L.A. Hart's dichotomy between causal responsibility
and "moral liability-responsibility." Id. at 210. Harris concludes:
If we have a duty not to kill others, it would be strange indeed if the
duty not to kill by positive actions was somehow stronger than the
duty not to kill by negative actions. I do not see how we can escape
the conclusion that in whatever sense we are morally responsible for
our positive actions, in that same sense we are morally responsible
for our negative actions.
Id. at 211.
Harris makes a fundamental conceptual error, however. In his defense it
should be noted that Harris's chief concern was not to differentiate between
moral and legal responsibility, although if a Marxist's decision to punish a
person depends upon whether that person brought about a "morally"
offensive state of affairs, then it matters little whether one terms Harris's
framework a moral or legal one. Regarding the merits of his argument,
summarized in the quoted material above, Harris errs because he equates the
act of killing with the non-act of refraining to prevent a death. Both actions
can be morally repugnant, but they remain separateand distinct moral evils.
To take innocent human life is gravely disordered; to refrain from saving
another's life can, depending upon the circumstances and the psychological
variables of the actors involved, also be gravely disordered; but simply
because two acts are evil does not mean that they are equivalent in every
respect. And this is Harris's error. When one refrains from saving another,
he may be just as morally guilty as the one who kills, but he is not guilty for
the same reason, because he has not caused a death; he has simply refrained
from saving a life. The distinction is nice but crucial; Harris either overlooks
or disregards it.
62. Kristin A. DeKuiper, Stalking the Good Samaritan: Communists,
Capitalistsand the Duty to Rescue, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 529, 532 (1976).
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an enforceable duty to rescue. 63 The question became somewhat

academic when the following provision in article 127 of the 1960
Russian Criminal Code was adopted:

Failure to Rescue. Failure to render aid which is
necessary and clearly not suffering of postponement to a
person in danger of his life, if the offender knew that such
aid could be given without serious danger to himself or
other persons, or failure to inform the proper authorities
or persons about the necessity to render aid, is punished
with corrective labor not exceeding six months or with
public censure, or entails the application of social64
corrective measures.
2. Common Law Jurisdictions
Five U.S. jurisdictions have some form of a criminally
enforceable duty to rescue: Hawaii, Minnesota, Rhode Island,
65
Vermont and Wisconsin.
a. Hawaii
Hawaii's duty to rescue statute reads:
Duty to assist. Any person at the scene of a crime who
knows that a victim of the crime is suffering from serious
63. Id.
One textbook writer of the Soviet era argued that the
constitutional duty to rescue was violated if a strong swimmer, standing on
the bank of a river, observed a man drowning and failed to attempt to rescue
him. See JOHN M. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW 412 (1969). In an
actual case from 1960s Russia, a group of neighbors were prosecuted under
the duty-to-rescue statute for failing to enter a burning hut and rescue
several children. Id. at 415. The neighbors were convicted, but the appellate
court remanded for a determination of whether a causal link existed between
their inaction and the children's death. Id. A Soviet reporter opined that the
neighbors should be guilty because:
Russians have acquired from the long centuries of conflagrations of
the Tartar-Mongol invasions the courage to enter the flames of
burning huts, and this trait has been intensified by the experiences
of the revolution and World War II. For these reasons entering a
burning hut to save life is accepted as a civic duty ....

Id.
Feldbrugge, supra note 40, at 656-57.
See HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.6 (LexisNexis 2002); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 604A.01(1) (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (2002); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 2005).
64.

65.
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physical harm shall obtain or attempt to obtain aid from
law enforcement or medical personnel if the person can do
so without danger or peril to any person. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a petty
misdemeanor. 66
b. Minnesota
Minnesota's duty to rescue statute provides the following:
Duty to assist. A person at the scene of an emergency
who knows that another person is exposed to or has
suffered grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the
person can do so without danger or peril to self or others,
give reasonable assistance to the exposed person.
Reasonable assistance may include obtaining or
attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical
personnel. A person who violates this subdivision is
67
guilty of a petty misdemeanor.
c. Rhode Island
Section 11-56-1 of Rhode Island's General Laws provides for
the following duty to rescue:
Duty to assist. Any person at the scene of an emergency
who knows that another person is exposed to, or has
suffered, grave physical harm shall, to the extent that he
or she can do so without danger or peril to himself or
herself or to others, give reasonable assistance to the
exposed person. Any person violating the provisions of
this section shall be guilty of a petty misdemeanor and
shall be subject to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
six (6) months, or by a fine of not more than five hundred
dollars ($500), or both.68
d. Vermont
Vermont's duty-to-rescue statute reads:
66.

HAw.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 663-1.6.

67. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1).
68. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-56-1.
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Emergency medical care. A person who knows that
another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the
extent that the same can be rendered without danger or
peril to himself or without interference with important
duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the
exposed person unless that assistance or care is being
69
provided by others.
e. Wisconsin
Lastly, Wisconsin law provides:
Duty to aid victim or report crime. Any person who
knows that a crime is being committed and that a victim
is exposed to bodily harm shall summon law enforcement
officers or other assistance or shall provide assistance to
the victim. [%] A person need not comply with this
subsection if any of the following apply: 1. Compliance
would place him or her in danger; 2. Compliance would
interfere with duties the person owes to others; 3....
70
assistance is being summoned or provided by others.

71
3. Textual Comparison of Statutes

This Part provides a textual comparison by jurisdiction, civil
and common, of the preceding statutes' common elements: persons
in peril, failure to assist, degree of risk and knowledge of peril.
a. Persons in Peril
As a general rule applicable to both civilian and common law
duty-to-rescue statutes, the duty does not arise unless someone's
life, health or safety is at risk; a mere threat to property, however
precious, is insufficient.

69.
70.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (a).
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.34.

71. Tomlinson uses a four-part analysis in parsing the French statute; I
shall use the same in analyzing all the provisions here. See Tomlinson,
supra note 43, at 475-87.
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i. Civil Law Jurisdictions
The French statute requires that the victim be "in peril." 72

French case law has interpreted that requirement to mean the
following: (1) A dying person is in peril, even though no assistance
could prevent the person from dying;73 (2) The duty arises whether
or not the peril was caused by the victim himself;74 (3) The peril
must be "imminent, patent, and requiring an immediate
intervention";75 and (4) a mere danger to physical health may give
76
rise to a duty to assist.

The German Penal Code provision makes no specific reference
to peril; the duty to rescue arises only during "accidents or
common danger or need."77 This language echoes the very first
German provisions, which imposed a duty only in cases of foreign
aggression.78 Conceivably, the German statute could be more
widely applied than the French version, as the former is not tied
to a particular person's suffering: an entire village aflame,
passengers trapped in a derailed train, or one injured in a barroom brawl might fall within its scope. The language could even
be applied to cases where only property is at risk. These
possibilities, however, are not realized in practice, for the German
statute has been applied less extensively than its textually more
9
limited French equivalent.7
72. 31 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE FRENCH
PENAL CODE 120.
73. Id. at 476. The Court of Cassation reasoned that not to console a
dying person by one's presence violates "the duty of humanity." Id.
74. Id. at 477. Tomlinson argues that the case law likely imposes a duty
upon a homeowner who has justifiably shot a burglar to come to the aid of the
burglar, who is considered to be "in peril." Id. at 477-78.
75. Id. at 478.
76. Id. at 479. Tomlinson cites a lower court case where the convicted
doctor refused to treat the flu-suffering son of a judge whose rulings the
doctor disliked. Id. Strangely, a lower court has refused to recognize a
person contemplating suicide, absent some particular distress or depression,
as being "in peril." Id. at 480-8 1.
77. 32 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE GERMAN
PENAL CODE 192.
78. Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 100-01.
79. One commentator interprets the German danger requirement as
encompassing "any serious danger to bodily integrity and health."
Aleksander W. Rudzinski, The Duty To Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, in
GOOD SAMARITAN, supra note 39, at 98. See also Feldbrugge, supra note 40,
at 633, 640.
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The Russian provision is clear: there is no duty to rescue
unless a victim's life is in danger.8 0 Under the Italian provision,
the duty arises when the victim is incapable of providing for
8
himself, appears inanimate, wounded or otherwise in danger. '
Under the Spanish Criminal Code, the duty arises when the
victim is defenseless and in manifest and grave danger.8 2 Under
the Mexican provision,8 3 a disabled, wounded or otherwise
threatened victim is a necessary predicate to the duty.8 4
Thus, the gamut runs from the most cabined duty, the
Russian version requiring rescue only when the victim's life is in
danger, to the most expansive, the German version requiring
rescue in a general accident or disaster.
ii. Common Law Jurisdictions
In Minnesota, a duty arises when the victim is exposed to or
has suffered grave physical harm. 85 The same standard applies in
Rhode Island.8 6 In Wisconsin, mere exposure to bodily harm is not
enough; rather, the danger must arise from the commission of a
crime.8 7 Thus, dangers caused by an accident or by a non-criminal
tort cannot give rise to a duty to rescue. In Vermont the duty
arises with exposure to grave physical harm.88 Lastly, in Hawaii,
a duty arises only when there is serious physical harm
89
concomitant to the commission of a crime.
b. Failureto Assist
The degree of assistance required of a Good Samaritan varies
from country to country in the civil law jurisdictions, and state to
state in the common law jurisdictions.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

86.
87.
88.
89.

Feldbrugge, supra note 40, at 656-57.
Cadoppi, supra note 12 at 128.
C.P., supra note 60.
C.P.F., supra note 60.
Id.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1) (West 2000).
R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-56-1 (2002).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 2005).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002).
HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.6 (LexisNexis 2002).
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i. Civil Law Jurisdictions
In France the duty-to-rescue statute speaks only of rendering
assistance. 90 The French courts have concluded that the duty to
assist is not necessarily discharged by calling the authorities. 91
The Court of Cassation has held that the "method which necessity
demands" is the appropriate standard to determine whether the
duty has been met. 92 In one case, a father-in-law refused to offer a
pole to his drowning son-in-law and instead went off to seek
help. 93 The court convicted the father-in-law because, under the

circumstances, he could have rescued his son-in-law himself.94 In
another case, a motorist with several passengers stopped at the
scene of an accident where two soldiers lay bloodied on the
ground. 95 The motorist refused to give the soldiers a lift to town,
stating that his car was already full.96 Once in town, the motorist

contacted the authorities. 97 Another motorist picked up the
soldiers and brought them to a hospital where they were treated
for their injuries. 98 The Court of Cassation upheld the first
motorist's conviction on the ground that the statute requires
would-be rescuers to act reasonably under the circumstances; the
conviction was proper because the motorist's conduct was
unreasonable. 99 The courts have convicted parents who refused
medical treatment for their children and healers who advised
against medical treatment, 100 but have refused to convict parents
who were ignorant of their child's emergency. 101
In Germany there is no clear standard regarding the degree of
assistance required of the would-be rescuer,10 2 although the text of

90. 31 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE FRENCH
PENAL CODE 120.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Tomlinson, supra note 43, at 482.
Id. at 483.
Id.
Id. at 482.
Id. at 483.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 483-84.
Id. at 484.
Id.
See Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 101-02, 111.
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the German provision speaks only of rendering aid.' 0 3 Presumably
that aid could encompass notification of the authorities in place of
personal rescue.
We can divine the scope of the Russian provision,
notwithstanding the dearth of cases interpreting the Russian
duty-to-rescue provision, because the text of the statute clearly
requires the rendering of necessary aid, 0 4 but the would-be
rescuer is given an absolute choice between personal rescue and
notification of the authorities.' 0
The Spanish provision speaks of "lending assistance."' 0 6 The
option of notifying the authorities is permitted only when one is
prevented from lending personal assistance. 0 7 Thus, the Spanish
provision provides a set of mutually exclusive duties that are
dependent upon the circumstances.
The Italian provision provides an absolute choice to the
would-be rescuer: give immediate assistance or contact the
authorities.' 0 The Mexican federal provision requires the same. 0 9
Thus, the gamut runs from the "choice" jurisdictions, such as Italy
and Mexico, to the French provision, for which notification is not
always sufficient to discharge the duty to assist, and perhaps to
the German provision, depending on its interpretation.
ii. Common Law Jurisdictions
Minnesota requires reasonable assistance, which "may"
include notification of the authorities. 1 0 Rhode Island demands
only reasonable assistance."' Like the Spanish provision, 1 2 the
Rhode Island statute refers to reasonable assistance in relation to
the victim; 1

3

consequently, notification to the authorities may not

discharge the duty if that aid is not deemed to be assistance to the
103.

See 32
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104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

192.
Feldbrugge, supra note 40, at 656-57.
Id.
C.P., supra note 60.
Id.
Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 128.
C.P.F., supra note 60.

110.

MINN. STAT. ANN.

PENAL CODE

§ 604A.01(1) (West 2000).

111. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-56-1 (2002).
112. C.P., supra note 60.
113. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-56-1 (2002).
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victim. The Wisconsin provision gives the would-be rescuer a
choice between personal assistance and notification to the
The Vermont statute requires reasonable
authorities. 114
assistance unless the assistance is being provided by others;"5
perhaps notification to the authorities would discharge the
Vermont duty, for once emergency personnel responded to the
Good Samaritan's call, they would presumably qualify as persons
116
providing "assistance or care" within the meaning of the statute.
Hawaii's statute requires notification to the authorities only; no
mention is made of personal rescue.
c. Degree of Risk
On this point the statutes vary greatly among the civil law
jurisdictions; however, greater uniformity is found among the
common law jurisdictions.
i. Civil Law Jurisdictions
On this point the statutes vary greatly. In France the duty to
rescue arises only when the rescuer bears no risk by his
intervention. 1 7 This textual interpretation differs, however, from
the gloss adopted by the French courts. 1 8 Generally, the rule is
that the risk perceived by the would-be rescuer must be one that a
reasonable person in the same circumstances would have
Hence, "the squeamish, panicky, or ignorant
perceived. 119
20
defendant must bear the risks a reasonable person would bear."
For example, a French lower court convicted several peasants of
failing to rescue a bloodied and wounded bicyclist whom they had
found in their barn, notwithstanding the peasants' claim that they
had thought the man to be a burglar. 21 In opposition to that
case's result is one from the Cour d'Appel Riom, where a man was
found not guilty when he failed to put out the fire on a mechanic's
940.34 (West 2005).

114.

Wis. STAT. ANN.

115.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,

116.

See id.

§

§ 519 (2002).

117. 31 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE FRENCH
PENAL CODE 120.

118. Tomlinson, supra note 43, at 485.
119. Id. at 485.
120. Id. at 487.
121. Id. at 486-87.

100 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.11:77
clothes, instead putting out the fire in his car. 122 The man's
justification was that he believed that the car might have
exploded had he not put out the fire when he did. 123
In Germany there is a triple qualification on the duty to
rescue: (1) The contemplated action must be one that can be
expected of the would-be rescuer; (2) The action must be capable of
being rendered without substantial danger to the rescuer; And (3)
the action must not violate other important duties. 124 The first
qualification is a nod to the German criminal law doctrine of
Unzumutbarkeit, namely that the law will not require an
individual to act beyond what he is capable of doing. 25 This
principle is also incorporated in the Austrian and Portuguese
analogues of the German statute. 26 Interestingly, the third
qualification is also found in Vermont's statute. Given these three
qualifications, one may safely conclude that the German duty to
rescue rarely arises.
The Italian provision provides for no exception to affirmative
conduct, 127 although an exception is unnecessary if a Samaritan
can fulfill the duty to rescue by notifying the authorities. 28 In
Spain, a Samaritan can avoid the duty to rescue only if the rescue
would create a personal risk or a risk to a third party, but the
statute does not state the quantum of risk to be incurred that
would excuse the duty. 129 Presumably some reasonable person
standard, like that adopted in France,"30 would be applied to make
that determination. The Mexican provision excuses the would-be
rescuer if he would incur a personal risk."' It is unclear whether
the personal risk exception applies only to personal rescue or to
notification of the authorities as well, but assuming that
notification of the authorities rarely involves personal risk, the
122. Note, The Failure to Rescue: A ComparativeStudy, 52 COLUM. L. REV.
631, 641 n.72 (1952).
123. Id.
124.

32 THE AMERICAN
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125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

192.
Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 128.
Id. at 107-08.
See id. at 128.
See id.
See C.P., supra note 60.

130.

See 31 THE AMERICAN

PENAL CODE

120.
C.P.F., supra note 60.
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question may be academic. The Russian provision does not
require personal rescue that would entail a serious danger to the
132
rescuer or to another.
ii. Common Law Jurisdictions
Greater uniformity is found among the common law
jurisdictions. In Minnesota, the would-be rescuer is excused if the
133
rescue would create danger or peril to himself or to others.
Presumably the danger would have to be real, or at least appear
so to the would-be rescuer. The Rhode Island statute excuses the
would-be rescuer on the same grounds.1 34 The Wisconsin statute
is absolute on its face (i.e., no allowance is made for danger to the
rescuer), although the rescuer may discharge his duty by notifying
the authorities. 135 The Vermont statute does not require rescue
when the would-be rescuer would endanger or imperil himself or
where a duty to rescue would interfere with other important
duties. 136 Hawaii requires intervention unless it would create
danger or peril to any person, but that intervention is textually
137
limited to notification of the authorities.
d. Knowledge of Peril
Is the duty to rescue limited in application to those persons
physically present at the scene, or does it extend to those not
present but who have knowledge of the critical situation?
i. Civil Law Jurisdictions
The French provision does not address the foregoing question
directly. 138 Case law indicates, however, that the duty extends to
those not physically present at the scene. 139 Professor Tomlinson
argues that in practice it is enough that the defendant should

132.
133.
134.
135.

Feldbrugge, supra note 40, at 656-57.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1) (West 2000).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (2002).
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 2005).

136.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,

137.

HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.6 (LexisNexis 2002).

138.

See 31 THE
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120.
Tomlinson, supra note 43, at 487.
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139.

§ 519 (2002).
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have known of the peril. 140 The Court of Cassation has explained
of the requirement that a doctor "informed of a peril of which he
alone is able to judge the seriousness cannot refuse his assistance
without doing what he can to assure himself that the peril does
not require his personal attention."' 4 ' Another case reported by
Tomlinson involved a doctor who was asked at his residence to
42
come quickly to attend to a bleeding victim of a bar-room brawl.1
The doctor refused to leave his house but offered to help the
injured person if he were brought to the residence. 143 The victim
died from his wounds and the doctor was convicted of having
failed to rescue. 4 4 Another case involved a mayor who while
walking came across a cyclist lying in a ditch. 145 Thinking the
man drunk or dazed, the mayor made the cyclist comfortable and
left.146 He returned to check on the man a few hours later, but
other people had taken the cyclist to the hospital, where he
died. 147 The mayor was acquitted, with the Court of Cassation
affirming on the grounds that the mayor was not aware of the
cyclist's peril and, consequently, was not obliged to render
8
assistance.14
The German provision contains no explicit requirement that
the would-be rescuer be present. 149 One commentator interprets
150
the German provision as not requiring geographical proximity,
but another takes the opposite view.' 5 ' Certainly the farther one
is from an accident, the less one can be expected to do in the way
of rescue. The Italian and Spanish provisions require that the
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 488-89.
143. Id.
144. Id. As a result of the case the French Parliament attempted to
amend the duty to rescue so as to apply only to persons present at the scene.
Id. at 489. The Latin Quarter Riots of 1968 intervened and caused the
disbanding of Parliament before the bill could be passed. Id.
145. Id. at 490-91.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. For more cases involving doctors, see Andrew Ashworth & Eva
Steiner, Criminal Omissions and Public Duties: The French Experience, 10
LEGAL STUD. 153, 159-60 (1990).
149. 32 THE AMERICAN SERIES

150.
151.

OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE GERMAN

192.
Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 106.
Rudzinski, supra note 79, at 102.
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would-be rescuer have come upon the victim.

152

analogue. 153
154

requirement is found in the Mexican
provision has no explicit nearness requirement.

The same

The Russian

ii. Common Law Jurisdictions
Minnesota explicitly requires that the would-be rescuer be
present at the scene of the emergency. 155 Rhode Island and
Hawaii do the same. 156 In Wisconsin and Vermont, knowledge is
157
sufficient for the duty to arise.
e. Conclusion
Although almost every civil law European jurisdiction has a
bad Samaritan law, these duty-to-rescue statutes vary widely in
the scope of the duty that they impose. Generally, all require the
victim to have suffered or be about to suffer some grave harm. No
jurisdiction in practice requires intervention to save property,
although the German provision is textually broad enough to be so
applied. The danger to the victim need not be life threatening,
however.
The extent of the assistance required also varies
according to jurisdiction. Some countries provide the would-be
rescuer with a safe-harbor, permitting the notification of
authorities to fulfill the duty to rescue in every instance. 5 8 At the
other end of the spectrum is France, whose courts may hold
would-be rescuers to have violated their duty notwithstanding
their notification of the authorities. Every jurisdiction in practice
excuses would-be rescuers from their duty if the contemplated
rescue is sufficiently dangerous; most provisions refer to a "grave"

152. Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 128.
153. See C.P.F., supra note 60.
154. Feldbrugge, supra note 40, at 656-57.
155. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1) (West 2000).
156. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.6
(LexisNexis 2002).
157. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519
(2002).
158. See, e.g., Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 128 (Italian Good Samaritan
provision); C.P., supra note 60 (Spanish Good Samaritan provision);
Feldbrugge, supra note 40, at 656-57 (Russian Good Samaritan provision); 31
THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE FRENCH PENAL CODE

(French Good Samaritan provision).
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or "serious" danger. 159 While the French provision merely refers to
"risk,"160 in practice French defendants have been acquitted only
when the risk allegedly perceived would also have been perceived
by a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances. Lastly,
civil law jurisdictions are mixed on the question of knowledge of
peril: some require the would-be rescuer to be present at the scene
for the duty to arise, while others require only knowledge of the
situation.
The American states' provisions are textually similar to their
civil law analogues but differ most importantly in two crucial
respects: the American statutes impose very slight penalties never
greater than a petty misdemeanor; 161 and none of the American
62
statues has been vigorously enforced.
B. Private Causes of Action for Failureto Assist
Although no civil or common law jurisdiction statutorily
provides for a private right of action for the failure to provide
assistance, bad Samaritans' victims can nevertheless maintain
private causes of action in these jurisdictions under the
appropriate circumstances.
1. Civil Law Jurisdictions
No civil law jurisdiction has a provision explicitly conferring a
right to sue upon a victim who required assistance under the
criminal statute but was not given assistance; however, this fact
has not prevented the courts in these jurisdictions from providing
bad Samaritans' victims with a cause of action. Indeed, in France
the right of the victim to sue the bad Samaritan is well
established. The suit is based upon one of two theories: (1) the
breach of the criminal law duty to rescue is also a breach of duty
for a simple tort action; or (2) the bad Samaritan's failure to act,
even without the criminal duty, is actionable in tort because it

159. See supra note 10; Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 128-29; C.P., supra note
60; Feldbrugge, supra note 40, at 656-57.
160.

31 THE
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161. See supra note 10.
162. Indeed, one American commentator has referred to these American
statutes as "feel good" laws. Stewart, supra note 54, at 422.
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was in itself unreasonable. 163 For example, in the case already
mentioned of the bad Samaritan father-in-law who failed to help
his drowning son-in-law,16 4 the latter appeared as a partie civile in
the criminal trial and recovered 25,000 francs. 165 On the other
hand, if the criminal duty is not breached, and the conduct of the
rescuer was reasonable under the circumstances, the French
courts will generally not allow recovery even though the "victim"
of the Good Samaritan has sustained injuries by the rescue. 166 In
one case, a man suffered a heart attack while attending a circus;
no doctor was available, but a nurse also in attendance came to
the man's aid. 167 Her asepsis was faulty and the man developed
an abscess. 68 The Cour d'Appel Paris sustained the man's action
against the circus for not having a doctor, but dismissed the action
against the nurse, holding that under the circumstances her
actions were reasonable and therefore not actionable. 69 The
German courts have not followed the French example. 170
Understandably, the principles that the French courts have
enunciated would be generally applicable to other civil law
jurisdictions: the victim's right to recovery must hinge upon either
the principle that a duty to act in criminal law also creates a duty
to act in private law, or, alternatively, that the failure to rescue is
unreasonable and therefore actionable. The latter theory presents
a causation problem by requiring that an omission serve as the
cause of a harm, but the French have arguably circumvented this
difficulty by concluding that the principle of human liberty
requires that people be responsible for both their commissions and
omissions. 17'
2. Common Law Jurisdictions
No common law jurisdiction, even among those that have bad

163.

See Andr6 Tunc, The Volunteer and the Good Samaritan, in GOOD
supra note 51, at 49, 50.
See Dawson, supra note 7, at 72.
Id.
Tunc, supra note 163.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id.
See generally Dawson, supra note 7.
Tunc, supranote 163, at 49.
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164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
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Samaritan statutes, recognizes a private right of action sounding
in tort for breach of a general duty to rescue. 172 If, however, the
victims of a failure to rescue can prove a special relationship
between themselves and the bad Samaritan an action will lie
against the latter according to the usual principles of duty, breach,
causation and damages, where the breach is in the failure to
73

act. 1

C. PrivateCauses of Action by Good Samaritansfor Damages
IncurredDuring Rescue
1. Civil Law Jurisdictions
As is the case with causes of action against bad Samaritans,
civil law jurisdictions generally make no express provisions for
action by Good Samaritans against their "victims." Nevertheless,
some jurisdictions have interpreted other civil code provisions or
general civil law principles to permit recovery in these
instances. 174 In France, recovery by Good Samaritans against
their victims is sustained on three theoretical grounds: (1)
177
negotiorumgestio; 75 (2) implied contract; 76 and (3) simple tort.
Negotiorum gestio178 is a civil law principle, derived from the
Roman law doctrine of mandate, that allows recovery to a person
who has incurred expenses in managing the affairs of another who
172. See supra note 10.
173. For an analysis of the common law rationale undergirding "special
relationship" torts, see infra Part III.E.
174. See, e.g., Tunc, supra note 163, at 48-49.
175. See, e.g., DIGEST, supra note 4, at 99.
If any man has managed the affairs of an absentee, even though it is
without his knowledge, he still has an action for whatever he has
spent beneficially on his business and also for any obligation he has
taken upon himself in furtherance of the business of the absentee.
As a result, this situation gives rise to an action on both sides, which
is called an action for unauthorized administration [negotiorum
gestorum.
Id. See also CODEX JUSTINIANUS 11.18(19); INSTITUTES, supra note 4, at 15355. For a discussion of the doctrine's Roman origins, see RUDOLPH SOHM, THE
INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OR ROMAN PRIVATE LAW
411-12 (James Crawford Ledlie trans., 3d ed. 1970). See also LEON SHELEFF,

THE BYSTANDER: BEHAVIOR, LAw, ETHICS 130-32 (1978).

176. See Tunc, supra note 163, at 51-52.
177. See id. at 53.
178. See supra note 175.
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is incompetent or otherwise unable to handle his business. 179 The
theory is somewhat analogous to the common law principle of
unjust enrichment. In the context of duty to rescue, both French
and German courts have interpreted the doctrine to permit
recovery by Good Samaritans against their victims. One famous
German case decided before the Reichsgericht in 1941 involved a
husband and wife who were being driven along a road. 180 The
driver lost control of the automobile and the vehicle fell into a
river. 1 1 All three occupants escaped from the car, but only the
husband and driver made it to the bank. 8 2 The wife remained in
the river and began to drown while calling out for help.18 3 A
nearby stranger dove into the river and kept the wife afloat until
the driver rescued her, but the stranger drowned. 8 4 An action
was brought against the husband and wife by the deceased's
family for loss of support. 8 5 In the end the wife and husband were
required to maintain the widow and minor children. 186 The
Reichsgerichtreasoned that, in calling out, the wife had impliedly
made an offer for assistance which the fallen rescuer accepted. 8 7
Thus the deceased's estate could maintain an action for the cost of
managing the wife's "affairs." 88
The French Court of Cassation arrived at a similar result in a
1955 case. 8 9 A car with several occupants caught on fire. 190 One
of the occupants was able to escape, but returned to the burning
vehicle to rescue the driver, who was insured.' 9' In the process
the rescuer was badly burned and later died. 192 The deceased's
estate won a judgment against the driver's insurance company on
the theory that the rescuer was the manager of the insurer's
179. See John P. Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio:
Intermeddler," 74 HARV. L. REV. 817, 819-26 (1961).
180. Dawson, supra note 7, at 73.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 73-74.
184. Id. at 74.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 76.
187. Id. at 74.
188. Id. at 76.
189. See id. at 81.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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193
affairs, which the Court of Cassation affirmed.
In the area of implied contract, French courts have afforded
Good Samaritans a remedy for injuries or expenses incurred in

coming to the aid of the rescue victim.

194

The theory presumes

that the victim impliedly (or perhaps explicitly) called for help;
that the request was an offer; and that the rescuer accepted the
offer.195

Lastly, recoveries have been upheld on the general civil law
theory of tort. Typically in these cases the rescue victims have
gotten themselves into the predicament through their own fault,
and it is that fault which is deemed the cause of any injury that
the rescuer subsequently suffers. One example comes from a 1955
Cour d'Appel Paris case in which a truck driver negligently stuck
with his truck on a railroad track. 196 After a train collided with
the truck two strangers came to the driver's assistance. 197 While
they were trying to help, a train from the opposite direction
collided with the truck, killing the would-be rescuers. 198 The
driver survived, and the widows of the would-be rescuers sued the
truck driver's employer. 99 The suit was upheld on the theory that
the driver's negligent action caused the would-be rescuers'
00
deaths.2
2. Common Law Jurisdictions
Generally, in common law jurisdictions a Good Samaritan,
once having acted, is required to carry out the rescue effort
reasonably or without gross negligence where a Good Samaritan
statute 2applies;
otherwise, the rescuer risks liability to the
0
"victim." '

Actions by Good Samaritans against their "victims"

193. Id. at 81.
194. See Tunc, supra note 163, at 51-52.
195. Id. at 52.
196. Id. at 52-53.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 53. At common law the action would probably be barred by
either assumption of risk or novus actus interveniens. Id.
201. See Robinson, supra note 39, at 638-39; David C. Biggs, "The Good
Samaritan is Packing": An Overview of the Broadened Duty to Aid Your
Fellowman, with The Modern Desire to Possess Concealed Weapons, 22 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 226, 228 (1997).
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may fail because of the doctrine of assumption of the risk: because
they act voluntarily, Good Samaritans also voluntarily assume the
risk of any harm to themselves or to others. 202 This reasoning
applies irrespective of the rescue victim's fault in coming to the
20 3
predicament.
D. Good SamaritanImmunity
Although statutory immunity for Good Samaritans differs
between civil law and common law jurisdictions, with no statutory
immunity in the former and uniform immunity in the latter, Good
Samaritans are generally protected in both.
1. Civil Law Jurisdictions

There is no particular code provision for Good Samaritan
immunity in civil law jurisdictions. Nonetheless, courts generally
protect Good Samaritans by applying a "totality of the
circumstances" test. 20 4 In France, for example, what might often
be negligence in other circumstances is excused given the urgency
of the situation requiring rescue. 20 5 Similar results may well be
expected in other civil law countries.
2. Common Law Jurisdictions
Every jurisdiction in the United States has a Good Samaritan
20 6
statute.
III. ANALYSIS
Can, and should, the European and civil law response to the
"problem" of the Good Samaritan be adopted in American common
law jurisdictions? And if so, wholesale or only in part? The issues
raised by these questions are the subject of this section.

202.

One example of this position is the fireman's rule. See RICHARD A.
352-53 (7th ed. 2000).
203. See supra notes 201-02.
204. See, e.g., Tunc, supra note 163, at 50-51.
205. See id.
206. Stewart, supra note 54, at 388 n.9. For a review of many of these
statutes, see generally Note, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical
Malpractice,64 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1964).
EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
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A. Considerationsfrom Psychology
A foundation of tort law is the reasonable person standard.
This standard works well because society and its constituents
justifiably expect that human beings have an intuitive rationality
and act in ways consistent with that rationality. Therefore, we
have no qualms about requiring all people to act reasonably in
whatever they do, and we expect them to remedy the harm they
have caused if they should fail to act reasonably. If duties to
rescue are like any other legal duty, the same analysis should
apply. But the bystander contemplating whether to be a Good
20 7
Samaritan is no more likely to conduct a Carroll Towing
analysis than any other actor. In fact, the bystander is probably
in the worst position possible to make any rational analysis. The
emotions of the bystander who wishes to intercede but remains
undecided do not foster clear and reasonable thinking.
Immediately upon witnessing an accident or violent crime, the
would-be Good Samaritan experiences:
first, the intense emotional shock - characterized
predominantly, but not exclusively, by anxiety; second,
the cognitive perception and awareness of what has
happened; third, an inertial paralysis of reaction, which
as a non-act becomes in fact an act, and fourth, the selfawareness of one's own shock anxiety, non-involvement
which is followed by a sense of guilt and intra-psychic and
20 8
social self-justification.
How can anyone be called upon to act reasonably if this is the
mental state to be expected from the average person suddenly
given the chance to play the role of the Good Samaritan? The
extreme anxiety that often besets bystanders would argue for a
less stringent duty than that imposed by the reasonable person
standard. The form of that relaxed duty ought to be influenced by
sociology and psychology, which disciplines have made
considerable strides in analyzing human behavior in the context of
altruism. 20 9 Although care is needed when applying sociological

207.
208.

United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
Lawrence Zelic Freedman, No Response to the Cry for Help, in GOOD

SAMARITAN, supra note 7, at 175.

209.

For research on altruism and human behavior, see generally GENETIC
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research to the study of legal issues, 210 research data from nonlegal disciplines in support of the following propositions may prove
helpful in determining the proper scope of any duty to rescue.
1. PersonsAre More Willing to Lend Assistance When They Believe
That Victims Are Not Responsible for Their Own Predicament2 11
Even without social research, this conclusion should not
surprise any student of humanity. If one of the maxims of justice
is to render to each person that person's due (jus), 212 then in a

crude, but not uncommon, calculus, the bystander who watches
the drunk fall into a ditch, the workman who observes the
disobedient child get into trouble, 213 or the man who sees his sonin-law tumble into a river 214 will conclude that the victim is not
due anything but what he actually received. Consistent with this
observation, duty-to-rescue statutes, to reflect existing social
conditions, should not require substantial affirmative bystander
conduct when the victim appears to be the cause of his own peril.
Interestingly, none of the civil law jurisdictions' statutes analyzed
above makes allowance for the origin of the victim's distress in
constructing the duty. This failure of indulgence, so to speak,
relates to these statutes' justification: If we wish to make people
better, or at least force them to act in ways consistent with those
of good people, we undercut our goal by making allowances for the
morally deficient.
AND CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (Peter Hammerstein ed., 2003);
ALEXANDER J. FIELD, ALTRUISTICALLY INCLINED? (2001); NANCY EISENBERG,
ALTRUISTIC EMOTION, COGNITION, AND BEHAVIOR (1986); MICHAEL SMITHSON,
PAUL R. AMATO & PHILIP PEARCE, DIMENSIONS OF HELPING BEHAVIOR (1983);

Jane Piliavin, et al., Responsive Bystanders: The Process of Intervention, in
COOPERATION AND HELPING BEHAVIOR (Valerian J. Derlega & Janusz Grzelak

eds., 1982); THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR (Nancy Eisenberg ed.,
1982); DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION (1981); JANE ALLYN PILIAVIN,
ET AL., EMERGENCY INTERVENTION (1981).
210. To illustrate the point: it has been shown that women are more likely
to offer assistance than men. See Note, The Duty to Rescue in Tort Law:
Implications of Research on Altruism, 55 IND. L.J. 551, 552 n.3 (1980). Does
it then follow that women should be held to a higher standard than men in
failure-to-rescue prosecutions?
211. Id. at 554.
212. See supra note 4.
213. See generally Buch v. Amory Mfg., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1898), discussed
supra at text accompanying notes 37-38.
214. See supra text accompanying note 93-94.
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2. PersonsAre Much Less Likely to Lend Assistance When They
Are Among a Group of People Present at the Scene
This phenomenon has been explained as the "bystander
effect": Responsibility for affirmative conduct is perceived as
diffused among all present; fear of being reproved by others or of
impeding a better rescuer discourages rescue activity from
individuals within a bystander group. 215
In light of the
implications derived from bystander-effect research for predicting
human conduct in emergency situations, statutes run the risk of
ineffectiveness if they require substantial affirmative conduct
from any particular bystander when a crowd is present at the
scene of an emergency or crime. To avoid the undesirabie results
of the bystander effect, duty-to-rescue laws should require
notification of authorities or other actions that can be done
without the actors needing to dissociate themselves from the
group. These limited duties would produce optimal results in that
their fulfillment would likely materially assist the victim, but the
duties would not require an "anticipatory" Good Samaritan to
215. See SHELEFF, supra note 175, at 14-23. Sheleff describes a multi-step
cognitive process. First, the bystander must notice the event and then realize
that a crisis exists which demands his response. Id. at 14. At this point the
bystander effect thwarts most potential Good Samaritans: people generally
ignore the hallmarks of an emergency, tending not to acknowledge the
existence of a dangerous situation. Id. at 14-15. Second, the bystander who
recognizes the dangerous situation must then decide whether he can
attribute personal responsibility to the crisis. Id. at 15. At this point the
"avoidance-avoidance" phenomenon emerges: the bystander is fearful not to
intervene but is also fearful to intervene if his intervention proves
unnecessary or unhelpful and he thereby humiliates himself before the
group. Id. at 16. Third and last, the bystander, eager to intervene, must hit
upon a means of intervention and then decide whether he can carry it out.
Id. at 17. Even assuming that the would-be Good Samaritan bystander can
successfully navigate through these mental obstacles, other psychological
phenomena also militate against bystander intervention.
The "difficult
versus easy escape" conundrum exists where the potential rescuer must
decide if he can render help and then "disengage" from the scene without
extensive commitment; if he cannot, he will be less likely to intervene in the
first place. Id. at 20. The "boomerang effect" describes the phenomenon of a
potential bystander who, although originally altruistically directed, decides
not to intervene for fear that the rescue victim will take advantage of him.
Id. at 22-23. Sheleff notes that most examples of bystander intervention are
simply types of vigilantism. Id. at 18. But for an endearing example of
bystander altruism, see the actions of Mrs. Brown (in contrast to those of Mr.
Brown) in MICHAEL BOND, A BEAR CALLED PADDINGTON 10-11 (1958).
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overcome the psychological obstacles attendant to the bystander
effect. The civil law duty-to-rescue examples discussed above do
not account for the bystander effect.
3. PeopleAre More Likely to Lend Assistance When the Person in
216
Need Is Perceived as Being "Dependent"on Another
Obviously, parents will help their children, and a husband or
wife will assist the other spouse. Existing law that enforces
affirmative duties in special relationships is well-suited to
prevailing social conditions, 217 but insofar as both the civil law and
common law have made allowances for such duties either in tort
doctrine or in criminal statutes, duty-to-rescue provisions need not
be specially tailored to address these circumstances.
4. Conclusion

Depending on one's theory of altruistic behavior, each of the
psychological impediments to encouraging affirmative rescue
conduct noted above can be overcome through the law's power of
definition and coercion. For example, the normative approach to
altruistic behavior would advocate a legal duty to rescue because
it would create a rule clarifying the ambiguities normally
attendant to emergency situations, and this rule would thereby
foster rescue efforts. 218 The social exchange theory would also
argue for a legal duty to rescue because a breach of that duty
would impose upon the bad Samaritan a cost in the form of a fine,
imprisonment or tort recovery. Because non-action would be made
costlier than action, affirmative rescue conduct would be
fostered. 21 9 In contrast to the normative and social exchange
theories, a socio-biologico-cultural theory would argue against a
legal duty to rescue because any such duty would have little effect
on behavior, 220 but the theory's opposition may be inconsequential
inasmuch as the socio-biologico-cultural approach assumes that
human culture naturally fosters altruistic behavior. 22'
In
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Note, supra note 210 at 552-53.
See Biggs, supra note 201.
Note, supra note 210 at 557.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 559.
Id. For a sharply differing view, see GARRET HARDIN, THE LIMITS OF
ALTRUISM 26-27 (1977). Hardin argues that pure altruism-a benevolent act
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summary, although duties to rescue are not completely at odds
with human behavior, to be effective they must take into account
various human inadequacies and fears.
B. HistoricalObstacles
To what degree are duty-to-rescue statutes the product of
authoritarian or totalitarian governments? To what degree do
they represent an advance in the law's development? The answer
to these questions is found in part in history. Legally enforceable
duties to rescue were first adopted in the aftermath of the
Enlightenment as the European intelligentsia became enthralled
with rationalism while the influence of Christian social and
political thought waned. 222 Nation, not religion, became the glue
of society. 223 In the twentieth century many European countries
provisions or
either adopted their first duty-to-rescue
substantially strengthened existing statutes while under the sway
of totalitarian regimes. 224 That development is not surprising in
light of the totalitarian state's principles of criminality discussed
above. 225 As this history intimates, although an altruistic element
is present in a bad Samaritan statute, merely because the idea
behind the statute is good does not mean that the statute will
produce good results.
In modern-day Western European liberal democracies the
state approvingly takes an active role in economic and social
affairs, whereas in common law jurisdictions the state has not
hitherto been conceded as substantial a role in the direction of
those same activities. 226 They may not strictly speaking run
not caused by selfish motives-is possible only in small groups; the interests
of the egoist, however, will always trump those of the altruist given a
sufficiently large group of people. Id.
222. See W. Warren Wagar, Introduction, in THE SECULAR MIND:
TRANSFORMATIONS OF FAITH IN MODERN EUROPE (W. Warren Wagar ed., 1982).
223. See, e.g., HILAIRE BELLOC, CHARLES I 23-24 (1933). The particular
example cited is that of England at the close of the Tudor dynasty, but the
same conclusion can be made of France during Richelieu's time, and certainly
of the German princes as well as the Austro-Hungarian empire with the
reign of Joseph II. See id. at 84.
224. See Part I.B.
225. For this principle in Soviet law, see supra note 61. For the same
principle in Nazi law, see supra note 41.
226. See, e.g., E. DAMSGAARD HANSEN, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC HISTORY: FROM
MERCANTILISM TO MAASTRICHT AND BEYOND (2001).
Hansen describes a
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definite shift to the Left by the 1950s in Europe and an accompanying
preference for state intervention in the economy. Id. at 275-76. By the
1960s-1970s government intervention to regulate wages and prices was
commonplace. Id. at 447. Concomitantly, Western European governments
obtained a larger share of their nations' GDP because of extensive welfare
and social security policies. Id. at 431. Although Hansen concedes that in
the 1970s a shift from Keynesian to supply-side economics occurred in several
European economies, id. at 446-47, most jurisdictions had by that time wellestablished duty-to-rescue statutes. See e.g., Part II.A.1.
State economic interventionism was made legitimate in no small way by
the thought and writing of John Maynard Keynes, although to a degree
Keynesian economics had been anticipated in post-World War I continental
Europe. See Robert Campbell, The Keynesian Revolution 1920-1970 364,
390, in 5 FONTANA, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE (Carlo M. Cipolla ed., 1977)
[hereinafter FONTANA]. But by the second half of the twentieth century, the
full effects of Keynesianism in Europe were plain in the statistics. During
the 1920s, public-sector spending accounted for less than ten percent of
Europe's gross national product, and by the 1970s for one-third. Id. at 391.
Keynes's theories were purportedly developed in a world economy
marked by less than full employment as well as an inequitable distribution of
income. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST AND MONEY

372 (1935). Keynes conjectured that "measures for the

redistribution of incomes in a way likely to raise the propensity to consume
may prove positively favourable to the growth of capital." Id. at 373. Keynes
did not advocate state ownership of the means of production, so long as the
state could determine how many resources should be allocated to any
particular means and the appropriate rate of return for the means' owners.
Id. at 378. He did advocate-and this is critical for tracking the shift in
European thinking as to the role of the state in everyday life-central
controls to balance the propensity to consume with the inducement to invest.
Id. at 379.
Whilst, therefore, the enlargement of the functions of government
involved in the task of adjusting to one another the propensity to
consume and the inducement to invest, would seem to a nineteenth
century publicist or a contemporary American financier to be a
terrific encroachment on individualism, I defend it, on the contrary,
both as the only practicable means of avoiding the destruction of
existing economic forms in their entirety and as the condition of the
successful functioning of individual initiative.
Id. at 380 (emphasis added). The italicized portion makes my point that the
logical relationship between a government more active in what previously
had been the private economic sphere, and a law imposing obligations on
conduct previously considered supererogatory and within the realm of private
concern is obvious. Both represent an erosion of individual liberty in favor of
a transfer of social responsibility to the government.
This "take" on Keynesianism has been noted by the Europeans
themselves. See Norbert Walter, Development of a New Economic Policy
Paradigm in West Germany in the 80's?, in KEYNES AND THE ECONOMIC
POLICIES OF THE 1980S 175, 175-76 (Mario Baldassarri ed., 1992).
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For nearly two decades German economic policy followed a moderate
Keynesian economic line.
The general political acceptance of
demand management policies was to a large degree due to their
success in overcoming the 1966/67 recession, when Keynesian ideas
or deficit spending were applied for the first time....
...
[A]fter two decades of unprecedented growth, economic
prosperity increasingly became taken for granted. Almost any call
for government subsidies or grants was considered affordable. The
welfare state grew substantially with more or less the full approval
of all political parties and of the general public....
There was a general shift in attitude, away from a sense of
individual responsibility towards a collectivist philosophy. With this
change, the government came to be regarded as having allencompassing responsibility for social-and economic-objectives.
Id. A similar expansion of government and social programs occurred in
France. See Richard Arena & Christian Schmidt, Keynes before and after the
General Theory: the theoreticalcontents of French economists' reactions, 192969, in THE IMPACT OF KEYNES ON ECONOMICS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 73, 90-96
(Luigi Pasinetti & Bertram Schefold eds., 1999) [hereinafter IMPACT OF
KEYNES]. But see Piero Bini & Antonio Magliulo, Keynesianism in Italy
Before and After the General Theory, in IMPACT OF KEYNES 131, 131.
Keynes, or Keynes's dummy, was in evidence everywhere. He could
be given any position. Liberals could delude themselves that by his
merit liberalism had not faded away. Catholics had named him
patron of their perennial instincts for compromise, fusion or
confusion of opposing demands, and manipulation of power.
Socialists appreciated his anti-bourgeois and statist traits. The
elderly believed they were rejuvenated. The young found reason to
mock the old.
Id. (quoting SERGIO RICOSSA, I FUOCHISTI DELLA VAPORIERA. GLI ECONOMISTI
DEL CONSENSO 43 (Nuova ed., 1978)).
Needless to say, there has been a substantial anti-Keynes reaction. See,
e.g., Walter Eltis, Has the Reaction Against Keynesian Policy Gone Too Far?,
in IMPACT OF KEYNES 51.
Foremost among Keynes's critics was his
intellectual rival and friend, the Austrian-born, English-educated and
sometimes-American resident F.A. Hayek. For Hayek, Keynes's fundamental
error was his assumption that general employment always positively
correlates with aggregate demand for consumer goods, when in fact, argued
Hayek, demand for goods is not demand for labor. F.A. Hayak, Contra
Keynes and Cambridge, in 9 COLLECTED WORKS OF F.A. HAYEK 249 (Bruce
Caldwell ed., U. of Chi. Press 1995). Hayek dismissed the General Theory as
a 'tract for the times." F.A. HAYEK, A TIGER BY THE TAIL 100 (Sudha R.
Shenoy ed., Institute of Economic Affairs 1972). He contended that Keynes
erred in positing the existence of "full unemployment" (i.e., the constant
presence of unused factors and commodities). See id. at 102-03. To have full
employment in a Keynesian sense requires that all goods be in a state of
excess in which the price system is redundant. Id. at 103. But what is the
price system if not a quantification of aggregate individual preferences-the
actions and wants of rational persons acting freely? See id. Thus, the spirit
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command or socialist economies, but Western European
democracies, which almost without exception impose legal duties
227
to rescue, have adopted the welfare state without reservation.
As a result, charity is no longer seen as the exclusive job of the
churches or private activity; rather, citizens look to the state to
provide for their needs. The opposite is true, if not in fact then in
spirit, in common law jurisdictions, especially in the United
States. The less active government is the better, 228 and the
of Keynesianism is akin to the spirit enlivening the movement for imposing
duties to rescue. In a somewhat halfhearted concession, Hayek noted that
Keynes was "so many-sided that for his estimate as a man it seemed almost
irrelevant that one thought his economics to be both false and dangerous."
See id. at 104.

For a view that all this is simply bickering at the margins, see HILAIRE
121-25, 199-200 (1913), in which Belloc argues
that because capitalism is an inherently unstable system, all capitalist
BELLOC, THE SERVILE STATE

countries must eventually become communist, servile or distributivist states.
Id. Belloc thought that England and Europe were headed toward servility.
Id. I take Belloc to mean that one cannot infer anything enduring about a
culture from its capitalist structure.
227. For an overview of welfarism in Western Europe, see Ian Gough,
Welfare Regimes in East Asia and Europe Compared, in NEW SOCIAL POLICY
AGENDAS FOR EUROPE AND ASIA: CHALLENGES, EXPERIENCE, AND LESSONS 27,
29-30 (Katherine Marshall & Olivier Butzbach eds., 2003). Gough identifies
four variants of the welfare state: (1) the liberal, marked by little labor
regulation and few government benefits; (2) the social democratic, which
typically requires high government expenditure; (3) the continental, as
developed in Germany, Austria and France; and (4) the southern continental,
unique in its emphasis on income transfer and extensive labor market
regulation. Id.
For a tour d'horizon of twentieth-century European planned economics,
see Benjamin Ward, National Economic Planning and Policies in Twentieth
Century Europe 1920-1970, in 5 FONTANA, supra note 226, at 698-99, 722-23
(discussing planned economies in Czarist and Soviet Russia, the Netherlands,
Scandinavia and Yugoslavia, French nationalizations and welfare-state
econometrics). For history specific to the Lowlands, see Johan De Vries,
Benelux 1920-1970, in 6 FONTANA, supra note 113, at 1, 30-42; for France, see
Claude Fohlen, France 1920-1970, in 6 FONTANA, supra note 226, at 92-100
(discussing French nationalizations, social security and the planiste economic
program); for Italy, see Sergio Ricossa, Italy 1920-1970, in 6 FONTANA, supra
note 226, at 266; for the Scandinavian countries, see Lennart Jorberg & Olle
Krantz, Scandinavia 1914-1970, in 6 FONTANA, supra note 226, at 377, 44043; for Spain and its period of liberalization followed by economic
"stablisation," see Josep Fontana & Jordi Nadal, Spain 1914-1970, in 6
FONTANA, supra note 226, at 460, 525.
228. Cf JOSEPH LOCONTE, GOD, GOVERNMENT AND THE GOOD SAMARITAN:
THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL OF THE PRESIDENT'S FAITH-BASED AGENDA 63
(2001) ("Americans increasingly believe that the surest road to moral and
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encouragement of private charitable efforts is considered a proper
role for government. 229 When viewed through the lens of charity,
the possible incommensurability of European-type duties to rescue
with common law jurisprudence emerges. Isn't an enforceable
duty to rescue a form of forced charity? Admittedly, the charitable
aspects of an easy rescue are well hidden, for the benefit the
victim receives is potentially tremendous (i.e., one's life), and the
cost incurred to the Samaritan is usually minimal (e.g., tendering
a pole to one's drowning son-in-law). But at some point of
abstraction we cannot fail to notice the somewhat uncanny
resemblance between duties to rescue and the Marxist principle:
"from each according to his ability, to each according to his
needs[.]" 230 It is obviously not a sufficient reason to refuse to
adopt a duty to rescue simply because other non-democratic states
social uplift is by way of Jerusalem, not the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services."); State of the Union Address of President George W. Bush,
February 2, 2005, http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=
current event&code=bushadmin&year=2005 (last visited Nov. 14, 2005)
("Our second great responsibility to our children and grandchildren is to
honor and to pass along the values that sustain a free society....
Government is not the source of these values, but government should never
undermine them.").
229.
America, at its best, is compassionate .... Where there is suffering,
there is duty. Americans in need are not strangers, they are citizens,
not problems, but priorities, and all of us are diminished when any
are hopeless. Government has great responsibilities for public safety
and public health, for civil rights and common schools. Yet
compassion is the work of a nation, not just a government. Some
needs and hurts are so deep they will only respond to a mentor's
touch or a pastor's prayer. Church and charity, synagogue and
mosque lend our communities their humanity, and they will have an
honored place in our plans and in our laws. Many in our country do
not know the pain of poverty, but we can listen to those who do. I can
pledge our nation to a goal, "When we see that wounded traveler on
the road to Jericho, we will not pass to the other side."
First Inaugural Address of President George W. Bush, Jan. 20, 2001,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inauglgbushl.htm (last visited
Nov. 14, 2005). See also LOcONTE, supra note 228, at 55. It is not without
some significance that, in emphasizing the primary place of personal charity,
the President referenced the Good Samaritan. See id. at 55 (quoting
President George W. Bush at his inaugural: "I ask you to be citizens: citizens,
not spectators ... responsible citizens, building communities of service and a
nation of character.").
230. KARL MARx, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME 10 (C.P. Dutt ed.,
Int'l Publishers 1938) (1875).
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have enacted similar provisions. All the unwanted trappings of
the other society do not necessarily come along with one of its
statutes. Totalitarian regimes have statutes against murder and
theft, yet we do not hesitate to keep our own correlative laws. Yet
the fact should give us pause that not until relatively recently in
jurisprudential history has a legal system imposed a general duty
to rescue, even though presumably the "need" for these duties has
remained constant throughout time. 231 And we should pause
again when we notice that the adoption of these statutes was
contemporaneous to the wave of fascist, communist, socialist and
totalitarian theories of government sweeping throughout Europe.
C. Ideological and Cultural Obstacles
Commentators have argued that an enforceable duty to rescue
conflicts with the individualistic or utilitarian thread running
throughout the common law. 232

These objections are generally

answered either by reference to the harm principle or on some
other equally utilitarian ground. 233 For example, a pro-duty-torescue utilitarian would argue that it is reasonable to agree to the
coercive power of criminal law sanctions because the cost incurred
(e.g., a restriction on the license to do anything) is small compared
to the gain to be had (e.g., freedom from others' violent or
otherwise injurious acts and, in the case of bad Samaritan laws,
rescue). 234 Of course not every utilitarian is an advocate for duties

231. One might even argue that the need for duties to rescue was greater
in pre-modern times, before the advent of police forces and emergency
medical services.
232. See, e.g., Charles 0. Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the Bad: The
Anglo-American Law, in GOOD SAMARITAN, supra note 51, at 23-27; Andrew
Ashworth, The Scope of CriminalLiability for Omissions, 105 L.Q. REV. 424,
427-30 (1989); A.D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal

Liability, 69 VA. L. REV. 1273, 1278, 1293-94 (1983); John Kleinig, Good
Samaritanism, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 382, 400-07 (1976). But see MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 82 (1991) ("In fact, there is nothing especially

individualistic or Anglo-Saxon about the origins of the rule [of no duty to
rescue, because aiffirmative legal duties to come to the aid of another were
unknown, not only in early English law, but to most other primitive legal
systems.").
233. Robert Justin Lipkin, Beyond Good Samaritansand Moral Monsters:
An Individualistic Justification of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31

U.C.L.A. L. REV. 252, 279-82, 287-91 (1983).
234. Id. at 279-82.
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to rescue. Character utilitarians are strongly opposed to such
duties; they argue that "forcing people to do good, even if there are
some very clear cases where such a policy is justified, inhibits
character development, restricts the scope of individuality, opens
the door to arbitrariness and unfairness, and should not be
imposed without significant social gain." 235
The pro-duty
utilitarian view also can justify the duty's appearance in tort law.
Persons agree to act reasonably because they wish to avoid the
consequences of other persons' negligent acts. This logic in turn
arguably supports an enforceable duty of easy rescue because the
cost incurred by an easy rescue is slight compared to the value of
236
the life that may be saved.
Just as the utilitarians are not in universal agreement as to
the propriety of legally enforceable duties to rescue, neither are
the civilians. One European scholar argues that, in light of
modern emergency services, it is in fact counter-productive to
require citizen rescues given the risks involved. The better policy
237
is to require citizens to contact the authorities and no more.

Surprisingly, in France the number of convictions under its bad
Samaritan statute has increased sharply in recent years despite
the advent of the Service Aide Medicale d'Urgence (SAMU), the
French equivalent of 911 emergency medical services. 23s Dispute
among civil law experts as to the appropriateness of bad
Samaritan statutes is no doubt due in some measure to the
revulsion that some civil law commentators, imbued with the old
liberal ideal of the autonomistic human being, voiced when duty239
to-rescue statutes were first proposed.
The common law's repugnance to forced charity also speaks
against a wholesale importation of civil law duties to rescue.
Anglo-American jurisprudence is individualistic because common
law countries' cultures tend toward individualism. 240 Community
235. Ellin, supra note 36, at 234.
236. A possible compromise solution is a national insurance program for
Good Samaritan rescue expenses modeled after maritime salvage, where one
might obtain the same result that duty-to-rescue statutes are meant to
produce but without the direct restriction on individual freedom. See Dawson,
supra note 7, at 87.
237. Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 123.
238. Tomlinson, supra note 43, at 493-94.
239. See Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 99 n.14, 102 n.24, 103 n.27.
240. A variation of this thinking can be found in Max Weber, who argued
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action is encouraged mainly only in the private sphere. 241
Government is not seen as a good in itself but as a necessary evil;
the less government needs to act and does act, the better. 242 This
cultural antipathy toward government is not present in those
European jurisdictions having duties to rescue. To the contrary,
the state traditionally has been viewed there as properly active.
Whether the state be an absolutist monarchy, socialist regime or
parliamentary democracy, government is granted a wide swath of
action, including functions traditionally considered in countries of
the Anglo-American tradition as charitable. 243 Thus, in civil law
countries citizens are more prepared to accept state-enforced pity,
in the form of social welfare programs, and state-enforced
beneficence, exemplified by duties to rescue.
D. ConstitutionalObstacles
Unconstitutional vagueness presents one significant obstacle
to creating a duty to rescue sounding in criminal law in American
jurisdictions.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes the states from enacting penal statutes
whose offenses are defined in such a manner that a citizen cannot
reasonably know which activities are proscribed. 244 A criminal

that the Calvinist Weltanschauung, which became in effect the secular mindset of the English and American capitalist, held poverty to be almost sinful
because it intimated too much leisure, begging sinful because the result of
slothfulness, and the spontaneous enjoyment of goods repugnant because an
occasion of sin.

MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF

157-71 (Talcott Parsons trans., Schibner 1958). "Not leisure and
enjoyment, but only activity serves to increase the glory of God." Id.
Extrapolating from this ethos to the example of the bad Samaritan, a society
steeped in Weber-like individualism clearly will be averse to duties to rescue
if for no other reason than a nagging subconscious judgment in the bystander
that the victim either should help himself or, if he cannot, that he deserves
CAPITALISM

his fate. See id.

241. See supra notes 228-29.
242. In this regard Madison's counsel, "[ilf men were angels government,
no government would be necessary," THE FEDERALIST No. 51 337 (James
Madison) (Sherman F. Mittell ed., 1937), and Jefferson's apocryphal remark,
"that government is best which governs least," strike a resonant chord. But
see Timothy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism:A Past for the Future, 27 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 489,492 n.l1 (2004) (crediting Thoreau with the phrase).
243.

See supra note 226.

244. "It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due
Process Clause if is it so vague and standardless that it leaves the public
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statute must not be "so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application." 245 No less a legal luminary than Supreme Court
Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting as a circuit justice, concluded
in United States v. Sharpe that criminal statutes must be plain to
be valid. Sharpe involved the prosecution of three Frenchmen for
instigating a revolt against the captain of a vessel. The statute
creating the offense did not define the word "revolt," which was an
integral part of the charge. Addressing this issue, Mr. Justice
Washington stated:
If we resort to definitions given by philologists, they are
so multifarious, and so different, that I cannot avoid
feeling a natural repugnance, to selecting from this mass
of definitions, one, which may fix a crime upon these men,
and that too of a capital nature; when, by making a
different selection, it would be no crime at all, or certainly
not the crime intended by the legislature. Laws which
create crimes, ought to be so explicit in themselves, or by
reference to some other standard, that all men, subject to
their penalties, may know what acts it is their duty to
avoid. 246
Questions of vagueness necessarily arise in prosecutions for
failure to rescue. Even where the statute may be textually clear,
not admitting of more than one interpretation, bad Samaritan

247
statutes, especially as enforced in France, are a "loose cannon."

For example, although the French provision provides dispensation
whenever a risk would be present to would-be Good Samaritans if
they were to lend assistance, the courts have applied a
"reasonableness" gloss to the language, such that fears and
worries peculiar to a particular defendant are not exculpatory if
not to be expected from a reasonable defendant in the same
uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits." Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S.
399, 402-03 (1966), quoted in Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999). "No
one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453
(1939), quoted in Morales, 527 U.S. at 58.
245. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 368 (1926); accord U.S. v.
Brewer, 139 U.S. 278, 288 (1891).
246. 27 F. Cas. 1041, 1043 (C.C.D. Pa. 1815) (No. 16,264).
247. Tomlinson, supra note 43, at 457.
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Moreover, bad Samaritan statutes always present the
troublesome question of just how much danger must threaten the
imperiled person before a duty to rescue will arise.
One
commentator dismisses this objection by arguing that what is
presented to the courts is just a run-of-the-mill determination of
reasonableness. 249 But the objection runs deeper than the
uncertainty of a reasonableness determination because it is
fundamentally unfair to judge a person's action with perfect
hindsight when the situation in which that person was placed by a
string of events over which the person had no control was so
unsettling as to have seriously diminished the would-be Good
Samaritan's perceptive faculties. 250
And not only are we
confronted, in a bad Samaritan prosecution, with bystanders who
were not psychologically "at their best," but we also run right up
against the profoundly American attitudes of "live and let live,"
"keep to yourself' and "mind your own business" that find
expression in our legal culture. 25 1 There are few epithets more
eagerly avoided in everyday life than that of "busybody"25 2 yet that
is the very label would-be Good Samaritans risk, recognizing that
turning an eye to another's distress may no longer be considered
good manners in a modern urban and individualistic society; it
may in fact be a crime. Thus, the combination of a bad Samaritan
statute's textual ambiguity, coupled with this conflict between the
purpose of the statute and an innate feature of the American
mind, creates vagueness of a constitutional magnitude.
E. Theoretical Obstacles
Broad duties to rescue wreak havoc with traditional tort
causation theory. The special relationship torts are the exception
248. See supra text accompanying notes 119-23.
249. Kleinig, supra note 232, at 402-03.
250. See supra Part III.A.
251. See FRANcIS H. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 294 (1926)
(noting "the attitude of extreme individualism so typical of anglo-saxon legal
thought"); FEINBERG, supranote 6, at 129. Cf BOHLEN, supra, at 340-41
(commenting on common law courts' conservatism).
252. The fear of being called a busybody no doubts plays a role in the
bystander effect, see supra Part III.A.2., and surely influenced Professor
Dawson in his article, Negotiorum Gestio: "The Altruistic Intermeddler." See
Dawson, supra note 7.
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that proves the rule, for the common law rule of no duty to rescue,
although normally presented under the heading of torts, is more
fittingly located under the heading of contract. In contract the
aggrieved party need not show that the breaching party
affirmatively harmed him. So long as the other party was
required to act under the contract and failed so to act, the
aggrieved party may sue for breach. 25 3 Usually these contractual
responsibilities involve affirmative duties that confer a benefit on
the other party. When a plaintiff sues for breach of contract, he in
effect is suing for a benefit which the defendant, by his failure to
act, deprived the plaintiff. The special relationship between
contracting parties is closely analogous to the special relationship
between husband and wife or parent and child, and these are the
kinds of special relationships wherein the common law courts
have found a duty to rescue, the breach of which is actionable.
The contract rationale which supports the common law duty to
rescue can be applied equally aptly to the other recognized special
relationship torts, as well as to the exceptions to the no duty-to254
rescue rule.

But the theory that supports, in civil law countries, tort
recoveries for failure to rescue is not easily translated to common
law jurisdictions because the notion of causation upon which the
civil law theory is predicated is at odds with the common law
principle of proximate causation. One respected commentator who
has advocated a move to strict liability for torts in general objects
to tort recoveries based on a failure to rescue for the very reason
that causation in the traditional sense is lacking. 255 Another
253. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE
68-78 (2d ed. 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981)
(Measure of Damages in General).
254. E.g., voluntary assumption of duty, the duty from landowner to guest
and, of course, contract. This contract-tort convergence does not include the
tort law "creation of danger" test because that exception to the no-duty rule
more closely hews to the conceptual framework underlying traditional tort
doctrine, according to which harm is actionable if created by an unreasonable
act. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (Conduct of a
Reasonable [Person]: The Standard). One commentator has termed this type
of tort as "pseudo-nonfeasance" to emphasize that it in fact is a type of
misfeasance. See Theodore M. Benditt, Liability for Failingto Rescue, 1 L. &
PHIL. 391, 401-02 (1982).
255. Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151,
189-204 (1973).
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commentator notes that:
The prevailing view seems to be that it is an attempt to
rescue that is due - nothing less, but nothing more. We
are outraged if a person stands by when he could help
someone else at no risk to himself, but we are not
outraged by the idea of his not compensating the victim.
Notice, by way of contrast, that when one person
intentionally or negligently harms another (by a
"positive") act, we are outraged by a denial of any
256
obligation to compensate.
Those who advocate a common law duty to rescue argue that
the causation problem which the duty presents is not an
insuperable obstacle to its adoption since the existing special
relationship torts do not require positive causation, yet the law
has been content with these limited affirmative duties. 257 This
answer to the causation problem ignores that "special
relationship" torts are, conceptually speaking, contracts imposed
by the state for various reasons. Because these torts rely on a
contract causation analysis, and not a traditional proximate
causation theory, the "special relationship" exception carries no
weight in arguing for a broad duty to rescue in tort.
Joel Feinberg has argued that negative causation theory can
bridge the gap between common law causation theory and liability
under bad Samaritan statutes. 258 Feinberg expressly avoids the
trap of framing the bad Samaritan causation analysis by reference
to duty and right, obligation and charity. He instead creates a
tertium quid, a "moral requirement," which is neither a duty nor
259
an obligation, "but... can be every bit as incumbent upon us."

256. Benditt, supra note 254, at 410.
257. Lipkin, supra note 233, at 267-69. In the same vein, another
commentator has argued that a duty to rescue is especially appropriate
because at the time of peril the contract values that would be vindicated
without a duty to rescue are comparatively small in comparison to the tort
values to be gained by imposing such a duty. See E.J. Weinrib, The Case for
a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 272-77 (1980).
258. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 159-63.
259. Id. at 162. Feinberg, in the following sentence, retreats somewhat
from his anti-duty stance: "Alternatively... we can think of the
requirements as duties derived from the not-so-special relationship of
'common humanity."' Id.
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Having crafted this supposed linchpin, and after having taken
several dozen pages to debunk traditional opposition to bad
Samaritan statutes, Feinberg asks us to follow him on trust:
The rest of the argument for the 'moral requirements' of
Samaritans must rest with intuition. It seems beyond
question to me, as a matter both of critical morality and
the morality that governs us here and now for better or
worse, that a mere Samaritan is morally required to come
to the aid of another party who is in dire peril of losing
his life or suffering severe physical injury, if there is no
person willing and able to effect the rescue who has a
prior duty or obligation to the endangered party and can
do so without help, and if the Samaritan has, and knows
that he has, the ability and reasonable opportunity to do
so without unreasonable risk, etc., to himself or to
260
others.
From this somewhat attenuated cri de coeur 261 Feinberg
concludes that bad Samaritan statutes can be "morally
262
legitimate."
Feinberg errs in two ways, however. First, he misconceives
the opposition. Most persons who object to duties to rescue do so
while maintaining that it is morally incumbent upon the
Samaritan to intervene. Feinberg does an admirable job of
showing us that the bad Samaritan's failure to act is immoral, but
that is beside the point, for it is one thing to say "this act is
immoral," and quite another to say "there ought to be a law."
Second, Feinberg errs in his causation analysis by equating
result with cause. Simply because one person is liable for the
same quantum of damages that another person is liable for does
not mean that the act by which the one incurred liability is
identical to the other's. Suppose a gourmand wishes to protect his
He
substantial collection of Veuve Clicquot-Ponsardin.26 3
therefore contracts with another to guard his house and its

260. Id. at 163.
261. I say attenuated because I count about a dozen conditions in the
passage quoted that must be met before a duty to rescue will arise.
262. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 163.
263. Let us assume that our gourmand keeps his Dom Perignon in a
secure and undisclosed location.
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vitiferous treasure. A thief with good taste comes along while the
guard is asleep on the job, manages successfully to steal the whole
lot, and later consumes it with oysters. Now, the guard is liable in
contract to the gourmand for the value of the spiritous beverages.
The thief is liable in tort to the gourmand for the value of the
same libations. The guard's liability is equal to the thiefs in
quantity, even though the former in no way "caused" the theft.
The same is true of the bad Samaritan. The Priest and Levite
who did not intervene to help the injured traveler might be liable
for the man's subsequent injuries. That is what Feinberg wants.
Presumably the robbers would also be liable to the man. But have
the Priest and Levite caused the harm? By no means; yet their
liability in theory is quantitatively identical to the robbers'
liability.
Feinberg's causal error can also be analyzed with reference to
the Classical maxims of justice. Feinberg would have the Priest
and Levite liable in justice both under alienum non laedere and
unicuique tribuere jus suum. The latter presupposes some preexisting duty, which for the sake of argument is posited. The
former forbids one from causing harm; yet under Feinberg's
analysis, by failing to render to the injured traveler his jus, both
the Priest and the Levite actually harmed the traveler in addition
to failing to make good on their societal "moral requirement."
Thus for a single "act" they incur a type of double liability. To
impose liability for a failure to rescue does not require the
adoption of Feinberg's theories; one need only expand the number
of special relationships to include a "special relationship" between
oneself and one's "neighbor." In this way a "social contract" to
which all members of society are parties would impose a duty
whose breach would be actionable just like any other contract.
This result may not be desirable for policy reasons, but at least it
would not require the abandonment of traditional concepts of
causation.
F. PhilospohicalObjections
We may move beyond legal causation and address directly the
philosophical complication in maintaining that the failure to
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rescue is the (or a) cause of the victim's subsequent injuries. 264 To
hold that a bad Samaritan's refrainment (i.e., failure to intervene
when intervention is possible), makes the Samaritan a causal
factor in the imperiled person's danger requires that there exist
some important distinction between the bad Samaritan who
cannot help and would not help if called to, and the bad
Samaritan who can help but refuses to help. 265 The language of

everyday speech does not consider refraining to be a causal factor
in another's harm. Suppose A is driving and falls asleep at the
wheel and crashes into a parked car owned by B. Certainly B
would have a cause of action against A in negligence, because A
caused the harm. When asked what the set of necessary and
sufficient causal elements of the harm is, B's counsel will say: (1)
A's driving, including pressing the accelerator with his foot; and
(2) A's falling asleep. Note that B's counsel will not add a third
element, A's failure to remove his foot from the accelerator, or A's
failure to refrain from failing asleep. These refrainments are not
causally necessary to the harm. 266

In the same way a bad

Samaritan's refrainment is not causally necessary to the imperiled
person's harm; it is necessary to the caused state of "failure to
rescue," but that is not the harm for which the bad Samaritan's
victim seeks compensation.
To take the Good Samaritan Parable as a case in point, it is
much more "natural" to maintain that the cause of the injured
man's suffering is neither the Priest nor the Levite, but instead
the robbers. At most the Priest and Levite are the cause of the
state of "non-assistance," from which the victim's injury might be
the psychological torment suffered in watching the Priest and
Levite go by without offering help. But the victim's damages
cannot include the wounds suffered at the hands of the robbers, or
the suffering endured between the time of the Priest and Levite's
passing and the arrival of the Good Samaritan, because these

264.

See Eric Mack, Bad Samaritanism and the Causation of Harm, 9
& PUB. AFF. 230, 254-59 (1980). For a rebuttal to Mack, see FEINBERG,
supra note 6, at 181-85.
265. Mack, supra note 264, at 255-56. Professor Feinberg argues that
even if a bad Samaritan does not cause any harm to the "victim," laws
criminalizing bad Samaritanism are nonetheless legitimate. See FEINBERG,
supra note 6, at 129.
266. For the original example, see Mack, supra note 264, at 258-59.
PHIL.
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wounds and suffering remain attributable to the acts of the
robbers, notwithstanding the Priest and Levite's failure to
267
rescue.
The civil law jurisdictions having duties to rescue that are
enforceable in criminal law tacitly recognize the attenuated causal
link between a bad Samaritan and the victim's injuries by the
penalties that these statutes provide. None of the European
statutes treat the failure to act as a comissio per omissionem. If
they did, then bad Samaritans who failed to assist when required
to, whose victims subsequently died of their injuries and whose
assistance would have produced a different result, would be held
to have caused the victims' deaths. This result is not obained
because European jurisdictions with duty-to-rescue criminal
provisions treat the offense as purely omissive (i.e., not resultoriented). If the European statutes recognize in criminal law the
causal separation between the failure to act and subsequent
injury, it is strange that this obstacle does not preclude, in France
268
for example, the imposition of civil liability.

267. At common law the inaction of the Priest and Levite would not be
novus actus interveniens severing the erstwhile causal connection between
the robbers and their victim's suffering. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 448 & 431 (1965). Section 448 provides: "The act of a third person in
committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm to
another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct created a
situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit such a
tort or crime .... " Section 431 states, in part, that to be a legal cause
negligent conduct must be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. I
recognize that this section of the Restatement puts the case backwards, in
that the bad Samaritan's inaction follows earlier affirmative wrongdoing, but
the principle behind the rule applies regardless of the order. See EPSTEIN,
supra note 202, at 491-95.
268. These causation difficulties can be avoided by adopting a contract
analysis, for the principle is well-established that if a failure to act is a
breach of contract, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235 (1981),
the party in breach will generally be liable for all the foreseeable damages
that would not have occurred had the party not breached.
See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 351 (1981). The classic case for this
proposition is Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. 1854), in which
the defendant argued that he was not responsible for the plaintiffs lost
profits on account of his breach of contract, because the lost profits were not a
foreseeable result of the breach. Id. at 145-51. The Exchequer Court agreed,
holding that the normal damages for breach of contract are those arising
naturally from the breach, or which were contemplated by the parties in their
contract. Id. at 151.
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G. Theological Objections
One argument why anything but a minimal duty to rescue is
a poor fit in the law is found in the Good Samaritan parable itself.
The lawyer's own answer to his question, "Who is my neighbor?",
was "The one who took pity on him." The key to understanding
Good Samaritanism is in the lawyer's use of the word pity.
Justice does not require pity. Pity takes up where justice leaves
off. Pity is supererogatory. Pity belongs to the province of God,
not of Caesar. The Good Samaritan parable explains the scope of
the obligation of charity, not justice. The Priest and the Levite, in
declining to help the injured traveler, transgressed the
commandment to love one's neighbor as one's self. Although that
269
commandment imposes a duty, it is a duty sounding in charity.
I do not mean to imply that the aversion of Anglo-American
jurisprudence to duties to rescue is rooted in a Christian notion of
charity, but only that the undeniable individualistic or
autonomistic strain that colors the common law is at least
fortuitously commensurate with a Christian conception of charity.
To determine whether the state should take a hand in the
enforcement of charitable activity and therefore whether the law
ought to enforce duties to rescue, we should have recourse to the
history of Christian social

teaching as implemented in

the

European private sector and, latterly, by European governments.
In the early Church the aim of charity was not to right social
wrongs but to awaken love in others and thereby bring them to
God. 270 Christians of the Apostolic and Patristic eras emphasized

269. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 7 CATENA AUREA: COMMENTARY ON THE FOUR
GOSPELS, COLLECTED OUT OF THE WORKS OF THE FATHERS 377 (John Henry

Parker ed., Oxford 1841).
CYRIL; After what has gone before, or Lord fitly questions the lawyer;
Which of these three thinkest thou was neighbor to him who fell
among thieves? But he said, He that shewed mercy on him. For

neither the Priest nor Levite became neighbor to the sufferer, but he
only who had compassion on him. For vain is the dignity of the
Priesthood, and the knowledge of the Law, unless they are confirmed
by good works.
Id. Perhaps the reason for the Priest and Levite's failure to help was their
fear of ritual impurity, which might have resulted from touching the victim if
he had been a Samaritan. The parable thus counsels the supremacy of the
law of charity over the rabbinical laws of first-century Judaism.
270.

ERNEST

TROELTSCH,

THE

SOCIAL

TEACHING

OF

THE

CHRISTIAN
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the philanthropic and private aspects of charity and thus were of
necessity limited to small-scale ventures with which government
did not trouble itself.27 1

By the Middle Ages Christianity had

arrived at a modus vivendi with the state: the Church conceded
that charity cannot renew the world entirely and that some
societal ills must be tolerated in the interests of the greater
good.27 2

Nevertheless, the Church's societal presence had a

profound transformative effect on European culture. Personality
and individuality were lauded as examples of the divine fecundity.
A community of believers developed to serve socialistic ends
without needing to abolish private property or remove incentives
for wealth creation. Society rationalized and explained inequality
by ascribing it to God's will: if God allowed the rich and the poor to
coexist, it was to foster among the former redemptive charitable
impulses.
Most importantly, the Christian ethos arguably
nurtured an "active helpfulness," "something which no social
order-however just or rational-can dispense with entirely,
because everywhere there will always remain suffering, distress,
and sickness for which we cannot account-in a word, [the
273
Christian ethos] produce[d] charity."
The pre-modern state took no hand in the "production of
charity." The modern welfare state, as a governmental charity
producer, dominates the European continent and has supplanted
the former charity producer, the Church. 274 Post-Enlightenment
Europe can be understood as a battle between the two Gelasian
swords, a battle whose immediate victor undertook the
responsibility of providing for the least of society and who became

134 (Olive Wyon trans., 1931).
271. Id. at 135-36.
272. See id. at 303-04. Troeltsch hypothesizes that this "truce" came
about because law was viewed as drawing its authority not from the
sovereign but from the will of God as understood through human reason. See
id. at 305-06.
273. Id. at 1004-05.
274.
It was rather the decline of religion, the impact of Protestantism and
the rise of the secular nation-state as a consequence of the
'surrender' of the Church to the state or as a result of the retreat of
the Church into the "private realm"-that have governed welfare
state development.
KEES VAN KERSBERGEN, SOCIAL CAPITALISM 193-94 (1995).
CHURCHES
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responsible for promoting charitable activity. This tremendous
shift in the respective social roles of Church and State began in
the wake of the Reformation.2 7 5 By the nineteenth century
continental European society thought of charity not as an
obligation but instead as a social right susceptible to legal
enforcement.27 6 If charity is not strictly speaking within the
domain of private initiative-if rather the charitable act is the
fulfilment of a legal duty and not a supererogatory benevolencethen it was incumbent upon the state to support the charitable act
by enforcing it.277 Consequently, the moral obligation to play the
Good Samaritan, not to pass by the injured traveler, became in
modern-day Europe a right of the injured traveler to require the
Priest, the Levite and the Samaritan to intercede on his behalf
lest the state should punish them and the injured "victim" seek
compensation.
As I have stressed above, this argument does not depend upon
the premise that Christian social principles undergird AngloAmerican jurisprudence.
The major premise of my position
subsists in this: duties to rescue, as a form of legally enforceable
charity, are incommensurable with juristic systems that seek to
maintain a substantial sphere of liberty for the private individual.
The minor premise: Anglo-American jurisprudence is marked by a
keen effort to maintain a substantial sphere of liberty for the
private individual. And the conclusion of my neat syllogism:
legally enforceable duties to rescue are incompatible with Anglo275. I should make clear that I do not imply post hoc ergo propter hoc; I
merely use the Reformation as a point of reference along the course of
European history.
276. KERSBERGEN, supra note 274, at 196. Along these lines I am
reminded of Chief Justice Marshall's remark in Marbury v. Madison that a
right requires a remedy. 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803). But see
FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 148-49 (arguing that, in the case of bad Samaritan
statutes, a duty without a correlative right is conceptually acceptable).
277. Professor Feinberg adopts this view. See FEINBERG, supra note 6, at
130-31. I cannot disagree more strongly with his position as expressed in the
text. He argues that a person who fails to help save a child from drowning is
not just "moral slime"; he is an outlaw because he has violated the "child's
right to be saved." Id. In contrast, I argue that the child has neither a legal
nor a moral right to be saved; indeed, even to speak of "rights" in this context
betrays a profound theoretical chasm between Feinberg and me. The wouldbe rescuer has a profound moral obligation to intervene. Professor Feinberg's
view in effect approves of the state supplanting the Church as fomenter of
charity.
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American jurisprudence. Although continental European legal
systems were not as strongly marked by the individualistic theme
observable in the common law, nevertheless there was a European
force that argued for a substantial sphere of individual of liberty
for the private individual-the Church. Once the Church receded
from its position of prominence and was replaced in its charitable
aspects by the welfare state, the force that theretofore had
maintained this sphere of liberty vanished. The state replaced it.
As a consequence charity ceased to be an obligation and became
instead a right. Charity moved from the private to the public
sphere, from the province of the Church to the province of the
State. Whether the identical process happened in common law
countries is irrelevant, for there the Church was not the only force
militating against a shrinking of the sphere of individual liberty;
the common law itself served that purpose and continues to do so.
Because it continues to do so, bad Samaritan laws are, on the
whole, inappropriate to our legal system.
IV. CONCLUSION

At the risk of merely contriving a legalistic deus ex machina
to resolve the jurisprudentio-ethical quandary presented by the
duty to rescue, I describe below what is in my opinion a possible
solution to that problem. Clearly the common law is not so
opposed to the notion of affirmative duties that it will not tolerate
any statute enforcing a duty to rescue, for it already imposes
affirmative duties, even among strangers in the case of an
emergency-creator.2 78 Furthermore, the criminal law in common
law countries enforces some affirmative duties which usually map
to pre-existing common law duties: hit-and-run statutes are a good
example; misprision of felony a somewhat antiquated one. These
tort and criminal law special relationship duties demonstrate that
Anglo-American jurisprudence is not at root opposed to an
affirmative duty to rescue. The special relationship torts also
reveal that, if we are to preserve legal causation in its traditional
sense, any duty to rescue must harmonize with contract principles
of bargain, duty and breach.2 7 9 I argue that as part of the social
278. See WILLIAM A. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 143 (1987).

279. See William A. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good
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contract, by accepting the benefits of community and government,
each citizen assumes the duty to render a minimal degree of
assistance to a person in grave distress. 2 0 Although the extent of
the duty for which I argue is quite small, given the duty's social
contract justification, a more substantial burden on the would-be
Good Samaritan cannot be justified without some additional bond
supporting the "special relationship" between rescuer and victim.
A. An Acceptable Compromise-A ProposedModel Statute28l
Based on the foregoing, the task is to find an appropriate
compromise between the legitimate promotion of the common good
and the preservation of individual freedom. This balance can be
best struck by crafting a penal statute that requires notification of
the authorities and nothing more. 28 2 An example of such a statute
Samaritans,and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7

J. LEG.STUD.83, 125 (1978).
280. I recognize that by extending the obligation to rescue to non-citizens
who are not party to the social contract I go beyond my social contract
justification, but not by much. The benefit to be gained by imposing the duty
regardless of the identity of the victim far outweighs the benefit derived from
the modicum of individual liberty preserved by limiting the duty to citizens.
Besides, because citizenship is not determinable by appearances, rational
Samaritans would not risk the chance of punishment on the gamble that the
victim were a non-citizen.
281. For other model statutes, see, e.g., Lipkin, supra note 233, at 266;
Wallace M. Rudolph, The Duty to Act: A ProposedRule, in GOOD SAMARITAN,
supra note 51, at 243; Rudzinski, supra note 79, at 123-24; Benditt, supra
note 254, at 415.
282. Thus I disagree strongly with Professor Malm, who argues that a bad
Samaritan statute enforcing only slight penalties is worse than no law at all.
See Malm, supra note 36, at 215. Professor Malm contends that bad
Samaritan statutes must be rigorously enforced with especially punitive
punishments or they should be removed from the books. Id. at 228. She
comes to this conclusion based upon her analysis of what bad Samaritan
statutes are attempting to accomplish: they are supposed to serve deterrence,
and they are to have a norm-enforcing or norm-creating effect. See id. at 22628. I agree with Professor Malm that bad Samaritan statutes ought to have a
deterrent effect lest they become mere "feel good" laws. See id. at 226. I also
agree partially with her second justification: that these statutes are meant to
have a norm-enforcing value, see id. at 226, 228, but I part company with her
in the way she quantifies the sufficient level of punishment for deterrent
purposes. Certainly a punishment of one year's imprisonment is less severe
than a punishment of five years' imprisonment, but I am sure that Professor
Malm is not a partisan of the Hammurabi Code, and that she would not
assent to truly draconian punishments for bad Samaritans, such as milliondollar fines or life imprisonment.
What any bad Samaritan statute
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is the following:
Duty to assist. (1) Whenever a person witnesses another
person suffering from or in imminent danger of suffering from
grave physical harm, the person shall immediately contact the
local emergency response authorities or local law enforcement or
both, as required by the circumstances as perceived by the person.
(2) For the purposes of fulfilling the duty imposed by
subsection (1), a promptly placed call to 911 shall always
discharge the duty to assist.
(3) Whether a person has discharged his duty under
subsection (1) shall be determined irrespective of any harm
suffered by the person whose suffering or then-imminent suffering
gave rise to the duty to assist.
(4) It shall be a defense to a prosecution brought under
subsection (1) that the defendant actually believed, however
unreasonably, that the person was not suffering from or in
imminent danger of suffering from grave physical harm.
(5) It shall be a defense to a prosecution brought under
subsection (1) that the defendant made a good faith effort to
contact the local emergency response authorities or local law
enforcement or both and was unable to reach either or both due to
circumstances beyond the defendant's control.
(6) The penalty for violation of subsection (1) shall be a fine
not exceeding $X or the fulfillment of Y hours of court-ordered
community service or both.
(7) This section shall not create nor form any part of any
private cause of action.
(8) This section shall not prejudice, alter or in any way change
the present state of the law as it relates to private causes of action
that any party had prior to this section's adoption or would have
now or in the future were this section not to exist.

accomplishes that cannot be done in the absence of the statute is the
imposition of the social opprobrium that accompanies a criminal conviction.
Professor Malm also refers to the argument that failing to create duties
to rescue is tantamount to a societal declaration that the life of the person
who is in need of rescue is worthless. Id. at 217. Ellin offers the rejoinder
that opposition to bad Samaritan statutes says nothing about what the
potential Good Samaritan's opinion is of the person whom he may help; the
absence of the legal duty simply means that society believes the burden of
rescue should fall elsewhere. Ellin, supra note 36, at 241.
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Gloss and Rationale
The model statute answers the societal call for the protection
of the common good but also gives due deference to the legitimate
concerns for the maintenance of individual liberty, theoretical
consistency in tort law and constitutional objections to vagueness.
The model statute incorporates the civil law precedent for
permitting notification of authorities to fulfill the duty to rescue
without falling into the quagmire of determining just how much
personal action is enough to satisfy the duty or whether a
particularly timid or impressionable defendant should be held to
answer for his social weakness. The statute adopts the position
that the only proper place for a modern duty to rescue is a penal
statute requiring notification of authorities under limited
circumstances. In this respect the model statute is consistent
with the few existing American examples, but the statute goes
considerably beyond these in accounting for the civilian experience
and constructing the duty in light of the myriad social, cultural,
historical, philosophical and theological factors discussed above.
Subsection (1) imposes a duty to assist only when a person
actually observes another requiring assistance. This element
precludes the unfortunate French practice of holding persons
accountable who were not present at the scene, a result that is
also possible under the Wisconsin and Vermont statutes. Of
course persons may still have a strong moral obligation to assist
even though they be not present at the scene; but lines must be
drawn, and it has been thought preferable here to err on the
opposite side of the line drawn by the French courts. The duty
arises only when the imperiled victim is observed by the would-be
rescuer to be suffering from or in imminent danger of suffering
from grave physical harm. This language precludes conviction
when the danger would come about in a week's time; it also
precludes conviction when the relevant harm is neither physical
nor grave. Consequently, one cannot be convicted for having
failed to assist when the harm is to property. This language thus
avoids the German statute's textual broadness.
Subsection (1) also adopts the Hawaiian precedent of
requiring only notification of authorities. It completely omits
references to personal intervention and thereby precludes the
French practice, exemplified by the father-in-law case, of
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convicting the bad Samaritan notwithstanding his notification of
the authorities. The phrasing of the model statute is broad
enough, however, to permit conviction when the defendant called
the police but knew that he ought to have called the paramedics,
or vice versa. Moreover, the phrasing normally would permit
conviction when the defendant contacted a non-emergency
government authority, knowing that such a response was
inappropriate under the circumstances.
Subsection (2) merely makes explicit the obvious, namely,
calling 911 where available is the simplest and most natural
response of the citizenry, and therefore is appropriately supported
by the criminal law. The statute's safe-harbor is a considerable
advance over both the civilian and common law jurisdictions'
provisions because it defines precisely what the law will
affirmatively require of a bystander.
Subsection (3) makes clear that violation of subsection (1) is a
purely omissive offense in no way tied to any other harm. In this
manner the causal difficulties rampant in civil law jurisdictions
are avoided.
Subsection (4) provides an affirmative defense to avoid the
French practice as observed in the case of the peasants convicted
of failing to assist when the victim was thought by them to be a
burglar. Granted that the allowance made for the defendant's
intentions is broad, perhaps too broad for most, nevertheless the
protection afforded the timid but not malevolent bad Samaritan
seems justified.
Subsection (5) provides an affirmative defense to ensure that
the defendant need not be successful in his attempt to assist. This
provision follows the civil law precedents.
Subsection (6) breaks with European practice by not affording
the sentencing judge the option of imprisonment. The amount of
the fine is left to the good sense of the adopting jurisdiction;
perhaps an exceptionally high fine might be warranted in cases
were the defendant's failure is especially egregious. But in all
cases the sentencing judge should make due allowance for the
peculiar diffidence or pusillanimity of the defendant. As for the
community service requirement, it may appear inapt that the
statute should punish with forced charity, but as the principle of
mandated community service is now well established in penal law,
its inclusion here has not been thought inappropriate.
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Subsection (7) completely avoids the French and German
practice of affording private remedies to those "injured" by the bad
Samaritan. This decision has been motivated mainly by the
concerns already discussed of theoretical difficulties in causation
as applied to torts at common law. It also avoids the practice of
allowing Good Samaritans to recover against their "victims."
Subsection (8) ensures that the statute will not affect existing
common law as it has developed to allow private causes of action
for failures to act under certain circumstances.
The statute's rationale is based upon the prevalence of
cellular phones and the well-established and efficient emergency
response services found throughout the country. The citizenry
generally has the former, and has become accustomed to using (or
at least aware of) the latter. The model statute thus builds upon
this social condition. The statute, it is hoped, will be more than a
feel-good law, and afford sufficient protection to individual liberty
and idiosyncratic defendants.
B. Value of the Civil Law-Common Law Comparison
A comparison between civil law and common law
jurisprudence produces three benefits: it provides fodder for legal
reform; it invites analytical assistance from other disciplines; and
it emphasizes cultural differences otherwise unnoticed. The
comparative analysis is particularly useful in the area of bad
Samaritan statutes, as nearly every European jurisdiction has a
legally enforceable duty to rescue, whereas only five American
jurisdictions have any legal duty to rescue, and even for these
states, the punishment for being a bad Samaritan is slight. The
jurisprudential differences between the two legal systems reveal a
profound social and cultural chasm between Europe and America
that cautions against any wholesale adoption of legal theory by
one system from the other.
1. Legal Reform
28 3
Anglo-American commentators, since the time of Bentham,
have argued for affirmative duties at common law, especially for
the duty of easy rescue. Many scholars have proposed model

283. See supra note 35.
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statutes along these lines, based in part on European
provisions. 2 4 Unquestionably, the common law's adherence to the
"no duty" theory has become attenuated in today's society of
urbanization, telecommunication and professional emergency
services. 285 Moreover, the common sensibilities of the American
people

clearly

favor

some

enforceable

duty. 286

A

legally

enforceable duty that requires notification of authorities in limited
circumstances is well-suited to the times and is a fair response to
the modern European commentators. 287 As the product of
comparative law research, the proposed law provides a double
benefit: it capitalizes on the experience of other jurisdictions, and
it rejects what is incompatible with the American spirit.
2. InterdiciplinaryResearch
It is a reasonable assumption that the number of bad
Samaritans in any particular country does not vary greatly from
the number of bad Samaritans in any other country. If that is
true, then the existence of legally enforceable duties to rescue in
civil law jurisdictions cannot be explained solely on deterrent
grounds; these duties must have some additional purpose. Until
the twentieth century, most Western nations left the duty to
rescue to morality. The sanction of social opprobrium and the
eternal consequences of sin were considered deterrent enough.
Since that time many European countries have enacted duty-torescue statutes to remedy the law's "insufficiency."
The
overwhelming majority of common law jurisdictions has retained
the old attitude of leaving the matter to morality. I have argued
that this split between the civil law and the common law
represents a significant cultural difference between Europe and
America that, if existent before the twentieth century, was not

284. See supra notes 232, 281.
285. The relatively late appearance of enforceable duties to rescue may be
due to the effectiveness of reciprocal altruism in encouraging Good
Samaritanism in pre-urban societies (i.e., the rescuer acts because he wants
the victim to perform the same service should the rescuer need it). See
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Altruism in Law and Economics, 68
AM. ECON. REV. 417, 420 (1978).

286. GLENDON, supra note 232, at 78, 80-81.
"In recent years...
uneasiness with the no-duty-to-rescue rule has grown." Id. at 88.
287. See, e.g., Cadoppi, supra note 12, at 123.
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obvious until now. The European looks to the state as a source of
moral precepts and civic duties, the first enforcer and source of
charity. 28 8 In America private initiative is still lauded and
9
considered the primary and best source of charitable activity. 28
Thus, the bad Samaritan statute comparison reveals a difference
in

mentalit629o between

the

European

and

the

American

concerning the role and nature of the state in modern life.
3. CulturalEnrichment
Bad Samaritan comparative research also produces a greater
awareness of the theories supporting contract and tort at common
law. The causation problem as it relates to duties to rescue 291 is
significant, for it demonstrates the civil law's willingness to
discard the but-for causation theory for a much more inclusive but
less rigorous concept of responsibility causation. 292 The adoption
of the European approach in common law jurisdictions would
require a deep-rooted transformation of the common law sense of
causation. As is always the case with bad Samaritans, their
"refraining" is in no sense a causal factor in the harm of the
293
"victim,"

but the requirement that the act be a causal factor in

the harm is central to common law torts.294 One commentator
answers this objection by citing the various "special relationship"
exceptions in American tort law to the general absence of a duty to
rescue. 295 The common law courts permit recovery here, even
though but-for causation is absent.
As I have stated earlier,296 making a theoretical
differentiation between contract and tort parries this rejoinder.
The special relationship torts at common law must be understood
through the lense of contract: owing to a pre-existing relationship
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
431-33.
293.

See, e.g., Walter, supra note 226.
See supra notes 228-29.
Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, supra note 13, at 45.
See supra Part III.E.
See, e.g., Tunc, supranote 163, at 45-46; Ashworth, supra note 232, at
Mack, supra note 264, at 259.

294. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY 92-102 (1985) (reviewing the various causation theories, including

proximate cause, last wrongdoer, natural consequence and the Palsgraftest).
295. Lipkin, supra note 233, at 268-69.
296. See supraPart III.E.
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that society deems especially important (e.g., husband and wife,
parent and child, employer and employee), the law will impose a
quasi-contract upon the parties to act affirmatively in certain
circumstances, including when the other party to the relationship
is in danger. Although the special relationship torts are not
treated in the books explicitly in this fashion, I believe that they
are best comprehended by a contract analysis, and in that way
they harmonize better with the common law system. And, if one
will concede the affinity between special relationship torts and
contract theory, the causation problem disappears, for recovery by
the injured party can be based upon a breach of contract which
will lie even in the absence of affirmative wrongdoing.
Nonfeasance thus may be actionable.
C. Conclusion
Absent substantial theoretical revision, the common law will
not support a general duty to rescue; but a minimal duty to inform
the authorities in an emergency, enforceable only in the criminal
law, is consistent with the ethos of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
The model statute discussed above describes such a duty. A more
far-reaching duty would create considerable theoretical and
practical problems.
And for the egregious cases of bad
Samaritanism that the statute does not cover, one must leave the
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enforcement to "Him who searches the heart."
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Minor, supra note 5, at 431.

